In contemporary culture, the problem of the relationship that exists between art and politics is one of the more intensively explored and described. The reason for this seems to be a politicisation previously unknown in Western culture, which is a function of today's most influential philosophical concepts.
Therefore, to understand the existence of art and politics more fully, it is necessary to briefly trace the history of the formation of its most significant approaches. Because the particular problems revealed by the title formulation are entangled in systemic solutions of fundamental importance at the level of philosophy and, therefore, can only be adequately understood as a function of these. It is only in the perspective of rational systematic reflection that it allows itself to be grasped in all its clarity and consequently to become an essential element of a worldview, in the sense of knowledge and a relatively stable set of judgements, convictions and opinions about the world, which form the basis of individual hierarchies of values and goals, determining the personal sphere of human life. Thus, to define – at least roughly - the theoretical relationship between art and politics, it is necessary to recall that each of them, conceived as an entity, has its essence; however, depending on the overarching systemic assumptions adopted, defined differently by individual thinkers, up to the postulate of its annulment.
For Plato, according to his theory of ideas and hierarchical gradation of reality, politics - belonging to the sphere of human action and culminating in state being - appears as a superior entity in the realm of social life, as it sums up and orders individual actions. Due to the assumptions made, art appears to Plato as an area of departure from being and truth[1]. Because it is an imitation of sensuous things, it becomes “an imitation of imitation, a copy that reproduces a copy, and is thus even further removed from the truth than sensuous things: art is 'three degrees removed from the truth'. Consequently, as Giovanni Reale puts it, “Plato is convinced that art turns not to the better but the less noble part of our soul. Art, therefore, depraves and should be largely restricted or even removed from the perfect state unless it submits to the laws of goodness and truth”[2]. Importantly, however, it is not possible, within the framework of considerations over the Platonic view of art, to confuse Plato’s attitude to beauty with art, “for the philosopher connects beauty not so much with art as with eros and eroticism, and they (...) have a different meaning and function”[3]. “Art has no truly autonomous object or value: it has value only if and to the extent that it can and does serve truth”[4], which is why its overriding criterion within Plato’s philosophy is mimesis, not beauty. Ultimately, then, art, in Plato’s terms, does not have value in itself but only through its participation in the truth, to which the philosopher, not the artist, has access, and therefore “if art wants to 'defend' itself from the point of view of truth, it must submit to philosophy, for only philosophy is capable of reaching the truth, and the poet must yield to the rules and dialectics of the philosopher”[5].
Politics as an organisation of human activities is thus a superior entity to art, whose value is proportional to its participation in truth, and therefore gains in importance when it is subordinated to politics, which, “if it wants to be authentic, must aim at the good of man. But since man is essentially his soul, since the body is only his fleeting and phenomenal shell, it is clear that man’s true good is his spiritual good”[6]. The soul, in turn, can only be cared for by philosophy, and therefore politics is identical with philosophy and the politician with the philosopher - as Plato consistently puts it in his “State”[7].
Plato’s systemic view of reality, based on a hierarchical structure of reality in which politics completely absorbs the issues of art, was contrasted with the aspectual view of reality formulated in Aristotle’s philosophy. However, although in his conception the Stagirite criticised and rejected some, in his understanding, erroneous elements of the Platonic state, at the same time, he maintained its fundamental ideal[8], also situating art in his system below politics, after all, by theoretically treating the two activities and their interdependence differently. In his systematic view, science was divided into three great divisions: the theoretical sciences, the practical sciences and the poetic or productive sciences. While the first comprised sciences seeking knowledge for knowledge’s sake, the second sought knowledge aimed at achieving moral excellence, and the third sought knowledge concerning the production of specific objects[9]. Furthermore, within Aristotle’s constructed system, the good of the individual and the good of the state have the same nature because both - the one and the other - are founded on virtue, but “nevertheless, the good of the state is more important, more beautiful, more perfect and more divine[10]”. As Giovanni Reale explains, this Aristotelian position:
The rationale for this conviction must be sought in human nature itself, which clearly shows that man is absolutely incapable of living in isolation and that, at every moment of his existence, in order to be himself, he must have reference to other people.[11]
Consequently, the State - within which laws and the complex organisation of collectivities are created, guaranteeing life according to objective, rather than particularistic, principles of goodness - ontologically precedes the family and the village, appearing to them as a whole against the parts. For this reason, politics, as the realm of the realisation of the ethical - and therefore of the goal set by it, i.e. happiness - is, in Aristotle’s view, a domain with a higher ontological status than art, which is the domain of praxis. As such, it contains a cognitive moment, for it goes beyond pure factual data, saying that it is so, “and reaches out to the cognition of why it is so, or approaches such a cognition, and as such constitutes a form of cognition”[12]. “The reason for including the arts in the general division of the sciences is thus clear, and the reason for placing them on the third and last step of the hierarchy is also clear since they are cognition, but cognition which is neither an end in itself nor even aimed at the good of him who acts (as in the case of practical cognition), but turns to the good of the object produced”[13]. According to Aristotle, “art partly completes what nature cannot realise, and partly imitates it”[14]. Such a formulation admittedly referred to the poet Aristophanes’ (c. 446-385 BC) formulation: “What we lack, imitation supplies[15]”, linking the aspect of lack to imitation[16], but in Aristophanes’ redaction, it was considerably deepened and refined. Henryk Kieres calls this approach to art a “privative” theory of art, the rationale for which is lack and the means of its elimination imitation (mimesis)[17]. As mentioned above, Plato already pointed to the mimetic nature of art, degrading it in his hierarchical-participatory system, and Aristotle, although he also emphasised the mimetic nature of art, understood this mimesis much more broadly than his eminent teacher - referring it not so much to the external appearance of things, but above all to the way nature works. Like Plato, Aristotle distinguished three types of production: things are created in nature, artificially and accidentally[18], so the artist, based on a “permanent disposition to create based on sound reasoning[19]”, creates new things analogously to nature. Analogously to nature, he creates new entities, for which the form is found in his soul, and art is not the imitation of the appearance of things captured in doxastic cognition, as Plato understood it.
Another momentous novelty of the Stagirite’s thought vis-à-vis his master’s conception of art was the way in which he included beauty within its scope, which Plato attributed primarily to eroticism[20], and if to art, then only from the perspective of the unity of the representation itself with the subject of the representation. The beauty of a representation, therefore, according to Plato, depends on the beauty of what is represented, and since beauty is identical to truth, a representation is only beautiful insofar as it is true[21]. For Aristotle, on the other hand, “art makes visible what is possible for man; it presents possible relationships of actions and attitudes[22]”; the beauty of art is thus rather related to the nature of catharsis as purification “in the sense of liberation and relaxation, which are the source of pleasure (hedone)[23]”. From then until the threshold of the modern age, beauty, although theorised differently, was closely associated with art: until the Renaissance primarily as the splendour of ideas, later especially as harmony/measure, while from the rationalism of Enlightenment onwards as one of its aesthetic values, until it became synonymous with the past and, in a dialectical process of development, had to be rejected.
The theoretical account of art and politics made in antiquity, in the two most prominent redactions outlined above, was also reformulated over time. However, it remained essentially unchanged until the late medieval period culminating in the revolution of nominalism - with minor interpretive innovations of Christian provenance, first in the neoplatonic conception of St Augustine, then the realist conception of St Thomas Aquinas. This may have been because the ancient philosophers systemically linked the moral to the political, and, furthermore, due to the consequence of the acceptance of Christ’s revelation in the Roman Empire, in the civitas Christiana (Christian state) also the moral - through virtue as a permanent efficiency of the mind and will of the person - was fully fused with the political. It should be added in this context, however, that the fusion of the political with the moral was already structurally inseparable in the ancient construction of the power of the emperor-katechon; it was not established, however, in systematic reflection but rather in the mystical tradition[24]. Leaving aside the meanders of the formation of models of power in Europe until the Renaissance, it should be noted that, regardless of this process, the fundamental relationship between art and politics did not change during this period, artistic activity was invariably linked to production, and political activity to the moral one, which was the basis of happiness, whether understood in terms of temporality or - as Christianity professes - eternity. An important change came about with the Protestant Revolution[25] insofar as its radical rejection of reason - which, according to Martin Luther, is the mark of man’s sinfulness in the notion of natura corrupta[26] - expressed, inter alia, in the thesis of predestination, consequently detached the area of faith from the moral aspect of action and thus liberated the political, making it a particular entity with its own aims[27].
It was also within this perspective that the next great philosophical systems arose, within which the relationship between art and politics was reinterpreted. Within this relationship, the hierarchy already established in ancient speculative thought and upheld in Christianitas was even intensified in the state-centric philosophical conception of Thomas Hobbes[28], Protestant in its theological foundation, in which the law, legitimised by the social contract in the state-leviathan, must order human relations on account of man’s evil nature. Growing out of an analogous theological background, similar supremacy of law - that is, of what is political - over art was proclaimed by the rationalist philosophy of Immanuel Kant[29]. According to this highly influential thinker, art is “production by freedom, i.e. by an act of the will (Willkür) which puts reason at the basis of its actions[30]” and, as in the view of ancient thinkers, art “as a human skill is also distinguished from science (skill from knowledge) as a practical ability from a theoretical one, as a technique from a theory (as, for example, the art of measurement from geometry)”[31]. At the same time, contrary to the ancient tradition, Kant distinguishes art from the craft as a profession, recognising it as free, i.e. not subject to wage-earning compulsion[32], which ultimately, in the process of successive theoretical reductions, freed art from any dependence on workshop categories. Hegel’s conception of art, which grew out of the same theological-Christian foundation, was quite different, situating it because of its common object - truth - alongside religion and philosophy, considering them to be different expressions of the absolute spirit. In his aesthetic considerations, Hegel wrote explicitly:
Art, by dealing with truth as the absolute object of consciousness, also belongs to the absolute sphere of the spirit and, from the point of view of content, stands on the same ground as religion in the stricter sense of the word and philosophy. For philosophy, too, has no other object but God and is essentially a rational theology, a perpetual devotion to the service of truth. Given the equal content of these three kingdoms of the absolute spirit, they differ only as to the form in which they bring their object, the absolute, to our consciousness[33].
Given Hegel’s understanding of truth as a contradiction, that which, in dialectical movement, returns in consciousness, revealing “that which is, that which is in itself, is only insofar as it is for consciousness, and that which is for consciousness is also in itself”[34], art appears as the realm of the action of reason and the constitution of the absolute spirit, while beauty is the complete sameness of phenomenon and absolute. Law, being “something in and for itself, (...) the absolute, pure will of all, having the form of direct being”[35] and reduced to a generalisation: “What is rational is real, and what is real is rational”, is an expression of the objective spirit, directly transcending the subjective spirit. Thus, in his panlogical system, Hegel elevated art above the political, thus preparing the ground for the modern reception of art.
Hitherto, Hegel’s philosophy was the last of the great systems constructed based on Christian revelation[36], henceforth - apart from currents preserving the realist core of the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas - religion was subjected to harsh criticism, which fundamentally changed the positioning of politics and, at the same time, art in the various systematic redactions of the idealist and variabilistic currents in contemporary philosophical reflection[37].
Perhaps the most culturally significant critique of religion was conducted in his thought by Karl Marx[38], for whom Hegel’s system was the substrate of theoretical considerations. Marx took over from Hegel’s philosophy the interpretation of the identity of being and thinking, the dialectical method and the manner of inquiry, but under the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach’s concepts, he positioned matter differently, placing it in the centre of the ontological order he had constructed. So, while Hegel, within the framework of a vision of continuous development, saw art as a sensuous representation and the first form of manifestation of the absolute, which in the process of the development of reality is to lead to the emergence of the imaginative consciousness as the place of manifestation of the spirit, which is the substratum of religion, to become in the final stage, as a complete and most perfect form, the philosophical revelation of the spirit in free thinking, Marx saw art as the first and most direct, but at the same time the most primitive form of man’s rational relation to the world, a consequence of the socio-economic development within which man gains more and more leisure time from work. However, the path to artistic expression leads, inversely to Hegel, through mythology and religion[39]. As a consequence of Hegel’s systemic view, art gradually disappears in the process of the realisation of the fullness of the spirit, for it is only its preliminary stage, whereas, for Marx, art appears in the arena of social life with the development of the economic process within which the necessity of alienation[40] is revealed. Art is thus a function of the political, for it is the driving force behind the process of alienation[41] central to Marx’s conception of development.
It should be understood in this context that Soviet Leninism, extremely revolutionary in the political and social sphere, proclaimed Socialist Realism as the official art in the former Eastern Bloc countries, while in the Western part of Europe, Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony arose based on Marx’s theory, demonstrating that “power influences society more through culture than through the use of force or law”[42]. Power, the Italian communist activist and Marxist theoretician argued, can be exercised above all through the tendency of social groups to participate in the oppressive system, which Gramsci put in the category of “social conformism”, which is, according to his description, “the consent given by the social masses to a government imposed on society by the dominant class. This consent is 'historically' caused by the authority (and consequently trust) that the dominant class enjoys by virtue of its position and function in the area of production”[43]. Thus, “the dominant class secures its cultural hegemony by persuading subordinate classes to accept its moral, political, and cultural values, convincing them that these values are right, true, and beneficial, although ultimately only the dominant class gains from them. To stay in power, the dominant class uses art, social consciousness, culture, customs, taste, etc”[44] In turn, when social conformity fails, the ruling dominant class can “legitimately” resort to the apparatus of repressive force against all those groups that have not consented to its cultural agenda.
Thus, ever since the religious aspect was finally detached from systematic philosophical reflection with the pompously and emphatically proclaimed phrase about the death of God by Friedrich Nietzsche, the issue of the relationship between the political and the artistic has undergone a new interpretation. After that act of removing God, as this famous son of a Lutheran pastor argued, man must make an effort to establish values, although he is ultimately unable to do so, for he grows out of a culture based on an appeal to God, and can no longer appeal to him because he has expelled him from his world - so, on the one hand, he has ceased to feel the sacrum and, on the other, he cannot live without it. In this axiological tension, Nietzsche saw the source of nihilism, understood as leading to a system of norms based on slave morality, hostile to life, and accepting appearances. For a reality so theoretically interpreted, the will to power was to be the essential remedy, and the creatively engaged man-artist became the model example of its making present. Like Hegel, Nietzsche positioned art at the top of his system, but unlike Hegel, he placed the subjective ontologically above the general.
Significantly, his decisions on this matter were a point of reference for later anthropologically oriented ontological systems, such as Martin Heidegger’s existentialism[45] or Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception[46], ultimately culminating in the most influential contemporary theoretical concept, the so-called critical theory of Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, according to whom art, while necessarily linked to philosophy, also reveals its thoroughly political nature and constitutes a blade of social criticism[47]. For Adorno argued that art “is helpful when concepts fail, (...) relatively independent of the repression of social structures, it demands freedom and criticism of society, and the artist in creating it discovers his own autonomy”[48] and that “every work of art is a moment; every successful one an alignment, a momentary cessation of process”[49], and the negative dialectic formulated in his “anti-system”, “which consists in the path to freedom, reveals the enslavement of humanity and mobilises it to live properly”[50]. At its core, Adorno’s anti-substantial thought radically broke with ancient, medieval, and modern traditions and postulated a theory of permanent revolution[51], the drive of which is, in fact, art. Adorno simultaneously stated:
With its inevitable detachment from theology and its renunciation of the whole truth of salvation, the secularisation without which it would never have developed, art condemns itself to reassuring existing reality while, deprived of hope for anything else, it reinforces the spell of that from which the autonomy of art would like to break free[52].
Adorno’s theory of permanent revolution consequently turns out to be the culmination of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, for the constant criticism of society through art is, in fact, political, constantly transforming social relations through culture. Obviously, in a reflection formulated this way, we can no longer speak of politics but rather of post-politics and also of post-art, or as Henryk Kieres prefers, anti-art.
Interestingly, after - as Adorno put it - the inevitable detachment from theology and the renunciation of the whole truth of salvation, and the consequent secularisation[53], philosophy became the substrate of the most inhuman political ideologies in history because, regardless of the distribution of accents in individual systems, which often placed art in the ontological centre due to the seed of an essentially anarchic liberation perceived in it, the political aspect ultimately absorbed everything, including art seen in this way. As Max Weber, rightly from the perspective of the consequences of modern philosophies, explained: the concept of politics “is extremely broad and includes every kind of autonomous managerial activity”[54]. This definition of politics also includes art, even if the essence of politics is to be seen as the acquisition of power - for what else but power is the essentially authoritarian artistic determination of the direction of cultural change for the whole of society in the name of Marxist emancipation, or freedom and process as a process, as Adorno postulated in his philosophy. Can’t we apply Max Weber’s conclusion in 1919 that “only he who is sure that he will not break down when the world, seen through his eyes, turns out to be too stupid or too mean to accept what he wants to offer the world, and is sure that, against all odds, he can say 'despite everything! - only someone like that has a vocation for politics”[55], to the vocation of the artist?
However ominous this diagnosis, uttered by Weber two years after the Leninist revolution in Russia and several years before Hitler became Reich Chancellor, sounds from a contemporary perspective, one must not lose sight of the fact that it was born within the framework of systematic reflection as a consequence of the rejection of metaphysics, without which all philosophical reflection must be established in a man deprived of the reasons for his own existence transcendent to himself, leading to extreme anthropocentrism, physicalism, cognitive subjectivism, ethical utilitarianism, axiological relativism, right up to the theory of criticism. In these perspectives, art and politics acquire different interpretations and ontological statuses, and once the final systematic conclusions have been adopted - as we have been able to trace briefly - art and politics lose their identity, dissolving into the Weberian category of autonomous managerial activity and into the process of life postulated by Adorno. It is then impossible to separate one activity from the other, for in the perpetual process of actualisation, they show one face and then another, in essence remaining an act of action. Therefore, when we ask about the relationship between art and politics, we should bear in mind the centuries-long process of systematic description of these two areas of human activity, and even that our question already presupposes a particular philosophical stance - a substantive distinction between these two entities, regardless of the answer that might undermine their substantivity, such as Adorno’s philosophical answer.
Also, when referring to practice and the possible clash between the two, e.g. in artistic creation, the above finding should be kept in mind. Ultimately, therefore, whether the artist consciously makes politics his art, allowing it to melt into what is political and only gain its face in its perspective, or whether, submerged in his artistic world and loftily distanced from current politics, he is unaware that the expressive language he uses formally and historically grows out of a particular political ideology, the result remains the same. For art in the contemporary world, completely subordinated to the action of a utilitarian nature, melts into politics, so regardless of the artist's professed worldview and the formal language they employ, every artistic form is politically stigmatised. Thus, by analysing the artists' escapism or political commitment that defines their art, we are, in fact aiming at the question of their philosophical consciousness, their understanding of how their artistic works or actions should be situated in the light of the centuries-old tradition of philosophical reflection. One can, of course, ask whether an artist needs such awareness to create, but this is like asking whether a particular voter needs a candidate's knowledge to make a political choice in the contemporary democratic world. Of course, it is not - and regardless of the stance adopted: profound awareness or ignorance, every artist or voter assumes all its consequences.
[1] G. Reale, Myśl starożytna, Lublin 2010, p. 179-181.
[2] Ibidem, p. 180.
[3] Ibidem, p. 181.
[4] Ibidem
[5] Ibidem.
[6] Ibidem, p. 199.
[7] Platon, Państwo, Kęty 2006.
[8] Ibidem, 283.
[9] G. Reale, op. cit., p. 230.
[10] Ibidem, p. 276.
[11] Ibidem.
[12] Ibidem, p. 301.
[13] Ibidem.
[14] Arystoteles, Fizyka, II, 8 (as cited in: G. Reale, op. cit., 302).
[15] As cited in: H. Kiereś, Spór o sztukę, Lublin 1996, p. 119.
[16] Due to the originality of the mimesis approach – much broader than the ancient one – and its importance for contemporary culture, it is worth recalling here the French researcher René Girard (born 1923) and his anthropological concept of mimetic desire culminating in the principle of a scapegoat.(see: idem, Sacrum i przemoc, translated by M. Plecińska, J. Pleciński, Poznań 1993 (cz. I), 1994 (cz. II); idem, Kozioł ofiarny, translated by M. Goszczyńska, Łódź 1991).
[17] H. Kiereś, op. cit., p. 119.
[18] Ibidem, p. 98.
[19] Ibidem, p. 97.
[20] G. Reale, op. cit., p. 304.
[21] G. Pöltner, Estetyka filozoficzna, Kraków 2011, p. 35.
[22] Ibidem.
[23] Ibidem, s. 36; por.: G. Reale, op. cit., p. 305.
[24] „The ruler as the incarnation of the deity and the combination of the royal function with the role of the supreme clergyman is a motif known in almost all pre-Christian religions: this was the legitimacy of the power of the Egyptian pharaohs, Sumerian, Babylonian, Persian kings, in archaic Greece the Achaean monarchs” (A. Wielomski, Teokracja papieska 1073-1378, Warszawa 2011, p. 13).
[25] See: A. Wielomski, Myśl polityczna reformacji i kontrreformacji. Rewolucja protestancka, Radzymin 2013.
[26] See: T. Guz, Refleksje nad filozofią niemiecką, Lublin 2004, p. 43.
[27] As it turned out, a few centuries later it allowed to give art an ontologically superior role, allowing the political aspect of human experience to be played.
[28] T. Hobbes, Lewiatan, Warszawa 2005.
[29] I. Kant, Krytyka czystego rozumu, Kęty 2001; idem, Krytyka praktycznego rozumu, Kęty 2002.
[30] Idem, Krytyka władzy sądzenia, Warszawa 2004, p. 224.
[31] Ibidem, p. 225.
[32] Ibidem, p. 226.
[33] G. W. F. Hegel, Estetyka, Warszawa 1964, t. I, p. 170-171.
[34] Idem, Fenomenologia ducha, Warszawa, 2002, p. 164.
[35] Ibidem, p. 280.
[36] Soren Kierkegaard’s existentialist philosophy, although it was a critique of Hegel’s system precisely because of the religious – Christian – aspect of the individual’s witness, did not gain the shape of a large closed system, while contemporary editions of philosophical realism, such as the existentialist-realistic philosophy of Étienne Gilson, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec or Christian personalism of Jacques Maritain, were mainly based on the already formed system of St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle.
[37] See: H. Kiereś, op. cit.
[38] T. Guz, op. cit., p. 37-62.
[39] S. Szymański, Społeczne uwarunkowania i funkcje sztuki według Karola Marksa, „Przegląd filozoficzno-literacki” 2005, nr 34 (12), p. 208.
[40] Marx reinterprets Hegel’s concept of alienation within the framework of his historical materialism.
[41] The aspect of the influence of Karl Marx’s philosophy on contemporary art is described in more detail in an unpublished text: „Co Karol Marks ma wspólnego ze sztuką współczesną?” [What Karl Marx has to do with contemporary art?], read as part of a series of discussion panels accompanying the exhibition "Feast at the Masters" at the Palace of Art in Krakow on 7 December 2012.
[42] Ibidem, p. 60.
[43] A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York 1971, p.12.
[44] A. D’Alleva, Metody i teorie historii sztuki, Kraków 2008, p. 60.
[45] M. Heidegger, Bycie i czas, Warszawa 2004; idem, Drogi lasu, Warszawa 1997.
[46] M. Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia percepcji, Warszawa 2001.
[47] In this context, it is necessary to recall the case of the German artist Joseph Beuys, who in 1967 founded the German student party. In 1971. Beuys accepted into his studio at the Academy of Arts in Düsseldorf all candidates who did not pass the entrance exam for studies and forced the university authorities to matriculate them. In 1972 or 1973, Beuys joined the Anthroposophical Society and, under the influence of Rudolf Steiner’s doctrine, developed a program of so-called “social art”, in which he put forward the famous thesis that everyone is an artist. The essence of the “social art” program was the belief that the artist’s role was not to create a single work but to create the only true work, society. The Gnostic character of the esoteric worldview of the Anthroposophical Society is revealed in this political-artistic vision of Joseph Beuys, within which the artist assumes the role of a shaman healing the spirit of the other. In accordance with the assumption of the extreme politicization of art expressed in the program of “social art”, i.e. the need for direct involvement of the artist in political activities, in 1979, Joseph Beuys became a candidate for the European Parliament on behalf of the Green Party.
[48] A. Szymaniak, Adorno Teodor Wiesengrund, [w:] Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, t. I, Lublin 2000, p. 68.
[49] T. W. Adorno, Teoria estetyczna, Warszawa 1994, p. 13.
[50] Ibidem.
[51] T. Guz, op. cit., p. 110.
[52] T. W. Adorno, op. cit., p. 4.
[53] Zob. przyp. 50.
[54] M. Weber, Racjonalność, władza, odczarowanie, Poznań 2011, p. 265.
[55] Ibidem, p. 320.
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