From the Genealogy of Life Ideals: Plato’s Ideal of a Philosopher

The genesis of life ideals

1. Both efforts to shape one’s character and educational interventions aimed at developing certain traits in young individuals while suppressing others often stem from a desire to bring oneself or others closer to a certain pattern or ideal of life. This pattern can be a type, a scheme more or less general, but it can also be an individual subject. Someone may decide to be a good Christian and, in self-improvement, strive to cultivate those virtues that, in their view, characterize the general pattern corresponding to the definition of a good Christian. Someone else may want to be like St. Francis of Assisi; they immerse themselves in his biographies and try to act in the manner of their adored saint. It happens that someone combines both aspirations: they want to come close to a particular type while emulating an individual model.

Among life ideals of the character of a general scheme, two types can be distinguished: conventional, traditional ideals and new ones born of the spirit of reform or revolution. In turn, a new, revolutionary ideal can become an ideal of the first category when it becomes deeply rooted in ordinary consciousness, turns to be commonplace, and takes on conventional, widely accepted characteristics. Parents often have such a conventional ideal in mind, more or less knowingly, when they try to raise their children “properly”, instilling in them traits commonly regarded as honourable, desirable, and appropriate in a given environment. The herd instinct and the instinct to imitate largely assist in achieving this goal. A “knight” in the era of the Crusades, a “virtuous man” in 16th-century Poland according to Rej, a “homme galant” in 17th and 18th-century France, and a Victorian-era English “gentleman” are a few examples of established, conventionally accepted life ideals in certain social circles. Following the old formula of Democritus, “either be good or pretend to be good,” people either genuinely strive to conform to these ideals – often having little to do with moral goodness – or pretend to be like them. Hypocritical pretence, at times, becomes the sole outcome of upbringing in the spirit of certain life ideals. Viewed in a mirror of failed - for one reason or another - copies, conventional ideals of life reveal their various flaws. Changes in social conditions and ideological shifts in philosophical and scientific worldviews also require a critical revision of prevailing standards. Given that development in this field occurs in leaps, new life ideals often emerge suddenly and unexpectedly, in the name of which individuals or groups engage in a struggle against the previously established traditional ideals. The outcomes of this struggle vary, and the genesis of a new ideal can be diverse. Often, it is the emergence of an extraordinary individual with reformist zeal and strong ethical convictions that either imposes a particular life ideal on their followers or grows in their eyes into the measure of an ideal model.

Intellectualism and aristocratism as the background of Greek life ideals

2. Following the development of the culture of Greek philosophy, we witness the birth of a life ideal that, until the end of the 19th century and even today, albeit in a very limited scope, plays a significant role in the spiritual development of individuals. This is the ideal of a philosopher. To the birth of this ideal, whose creator Plato was, is devoted to this study.

Early on, in the 7th to 6th centuries B.C., the Greeks’ thirst for knowledge was no longer satisfied by myths and legends. Intellectualism and rationalism became evident early in the development of their culture. This intellectual shift as early as the 6th century B.C. explains the independence of natural philosophy from myths (as seen in the Ionian philosophers), criticism of anthropomorphism, polytheism, and certain forms of Greek religious cults (as expressed by Xenophanes and Heraclitus), a propensity for criticism and scepticism, and a reluctance toward any overt or masked foolishness. In this disregard for foolishness, one can discern one of the sources of aristocratic tendencies in some Greek philosophers. Most people are foolish, governed by blind desires and emotions, while only a few are truly wise. These few are also the best, even though the crowd ridicules them.

The fifth century B.C. may rightly be called the age of the Greek enlightenment and rationalism. Greek rationalism is expressed both in the pursuit of solving theoretical problems solely through rational methods (experience and reasoning) and in the criticism of traditional, conventional beliefs, customs and norms of conduct, as well as in the construction of a new theory of values.

It is characteristic that this rationalist attitude gave rise to two vastly different and consequently opposing currents of thought in antiquity: sophistry and Socratic philosophy. And it is not that in epistemology the sophists were sensualists and Socrates the rationalist in the stricter sense[1]). There were, after all, sensualists among the Socratics (Aristippus and Antisthenes). The difference we are interested in does not arise from the fact that the sophists were relativists while Socrates was an absolutist. The diversity of interest to us here results from a different assessment of values and goods of life. For it was against the background of these differences that the Greek ideal of a philosopher developed and clarified.

Rationalism at the core of the value theory sounds almost like a paradox. After all, any value judgment that is unconditioned, meaning one that asserts, “X is good” or “X is bad,” without providing any further explanation like “X is good because of Y” or “X is bad due to Y,” is based on specific experiences of an emotional rather than an intellectual nature. X is good in itself if and only if X is desired, beloved, etc., for its own sake as a final goal, not as a means to achieve anything else. Therefore, a certain emotional state dictates judgments of unconditioned values. For a rationalist, reason is a good and undoubtedly a positive value. Naturally, the rationalist will place reason in a hierarchy of goods as an ultimate, unconditioned good or as one of the supreme conditions of the highest good. In any case, they will adopt or create a life ideal in which intellectual elements will be strongly emphasized. The ideal will be a “wise person”, a “friend of wisdom”. This is the common backdrop of the sophistic and Socratic value theory. However, against this common backdrop, different patterns have arisen, resulting from a different understanding of reason. Sophists and Socratics were inclined to call different individuals “wise”. Sophists, in their pedagogical activity, were guided by the ideal of a biologically efficient and adapted-to-environment politician, capable of ruling and directing others,  surpassing them in shrewdness, education, and eloquence. The life ideal of the Socratics became the ideal of the philosopher.

Socrates as a prototype of the perfect philosopher

3. The ideal of a philosopher in the history of Greek culture belongs to the category of those that originated from opposition and reformist aspirations and was modelled by an individual who admired their beloved teacher. Because this ideal emerged under the influence of the struggle that Socrates and his disciples waged against their milieu, and it took on its features from Socrates. Plato bestowed these features in his dialogues[2].

Socrates valued reason above all else and saw the greatest evil in foolishness. He enjoyed exploring, probing, and knowing. Knowing in a genuine sense, not settling for common, conventional opinions. Understanding the essence of things revealed through general concepts and judgments and not being deceived by the appearances of reality that impose themselves on a person through variable, subjective sensory impressions. Being aware of one’s ignorance when there was something one did not know[3]). In life, Socrates valued personal freedom and independence. He primarily understood it as the inner freedom of a person. Freedom from falsehood, fear, desires, longings, and fruitless sorrows. One can be in prison and still be free, meaning internally independent of fate and the violence of wicked man, or one can be a dictator and simultaneously be a thrall to false judgments, fear, and insatiable desires. Only a self-disciplined individual who knows the proper measure of everything is truly free. Such was Socrates, whether the matter at hand was Eros, fear of public opinion, or fear of death. He shunned politics. He considered causing harm to be the greatest evil and asininity at the same time. He believed it was better to suffer harm than to inflict it. If someone cared for their soul’s health and inner beauty.

Socrates combined his life stance with an idiosyncratic personal charm. God in a Silenus mask, according to the words of Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium. Therefore, it is not surprising that he attracted some of the finest individuals in Athens to his milieu. Particularly among the young. It is also not surprising that, in the eyes of his enamoured students, he grew to the stature of an ideal. When reading Plato’s dialogues, such as the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic, and Symposium, one can observe these very qualities of Socrates’ disposition which later generalized and transformed into a certain model will serve to describe a philosopher in general.

Plato on the type of philosopher

4. This description is also found in Plato’s dialogues. Plato intended to dedicate a separate dialogue to the analysis of the concept of a “philosopher”. With this dialogue he wanted to conclude the Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher trilogy. The juxtaposition of these three types was not unexpected in Plato’s time. The sophist Prodicus of Ceos believed that a “sophist is half philosopher and half politician.” Plato sharply contrasted the philosopher type with the sophist type but was inclined to believe that a philosopher could and should be a politician—a perfect politician. Not the kind he knew from his own Athenian or Syracusan experiences. Of the planned trilogy, Plato only wrote two dialogues: Sophist and Statesman. The dialogue on the philosopher was never completed. Nevertheless, Plato’s writings contain discussions dedicated to analysing this concept. Of particular significance in this regard are Books V and VI of the Republic and chapters XXIV and XXV of the Theaetetus. However, in other dialogues as well, such as the Phaedo, Plato addresses this topic that keenly interested him.

The caricature of a philosopher in Theaetetus

5. The description of a philosopher presented in the Theaetetus is done in a playful manner. Plato was familiar with Aristophanes’ comedies directed against Socrates. It was not a caricature; it was a pamphlet. Because a caricaturist emphasizes and exaggerates certain features of the model, but those that genuinely apply to them, whereas the one who composes pamphlets often resorts to slanderous fabrications. By portraying Socrates as a grotesque sophist, Aristophanes painted an inaccurate picture. Such a portrayal might have fitted Hippias, not Socrates. Plato also had a streak of a playwright and a sense of humour that allowed him to perceive comical aspects of his surroundings, even when it came to people close and dear. He was also able – a true artist – to empathize with various types of people and look at the world through their eyes. He understood that the average Athenian citizen must have found the philosopher’s way of life and thinking comical. Such a droll, pensive, life-awkward type. Who did not know where he was going, with his eyes fixed on the stars. However, Plato felt that this was a superficial kind of comicality. The truly comical one is not the researcher but the speculator, not the thinker but the cunning, opportunistic careerist. For the latter is genuinely foolish and does not realize they are moving away from true goodness.

Philosopher as a researcher

6. In Plato’s view, a philosopher is first and foremost a researcher, a man with outstanding scientific and theoretical interests[4]): “takes flight - as Pindar says - above the heavens and beneath the earth, measuring the earth’s vast surfaces, studying the stars and searching out, in every way,  the complete nature of each whole, among the things that are, never lowering itself to anything that is near at hand” (Theaetetus, Vol. XXIV, Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1921.)

He is a lover of wisdom and truth. Moreover, since truth is expressed in general judgments whose objects are not individual empirical phenomena but rather the eternal and unchanging archetypes of them: the ideas, thus the philosopher turns to the world of ideas with his interests. He is not content with perceiving the phenomena around him and the illusory beliefs about the world, but through conceptual analysis, definitions, and generalizations, he seeks to grasp the essence of each thing. Therefore, “[they are] ever enamoured of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.” From this characteristic feature of the philosopher being a disinterested lover of truth, Plato attempts to derive other traits of this personality type. Thus, the intense focus on the realm of real being, namely the ideas, diverts the philosopher’s attention from “the affairs of this world.” The philosopher does not attach importance to the transient, impermanent sensory objects that arise and perish, to their illusory appearances, reflections, and shadows. He knows that these things are not truly real. They exist somewhere between being and non-being, and knowledge of them through the senses is not true knowledge but rather a vague belief. Against this backdrop of the philosopher’s attitude toward reality, a specific attitude toward love and death is formed.

The philosopher and love

7. In grand, winged myth of Phaedrus, speaking of love, Plato emphasizes that in the journey of souls, the feathers will most quickly “grow back” in the soul of the one who “loved young people like a philosopher.” How does a philosopher love? Firstly, recognizing the essence of beauty, they seek the reflection of that essence in specific empirical objects. Secondly, they exercise self-control, subordinating passion to reason. Thirdly, they seek to “explore and foster” the soul of the beloved. Mutual perfection and the joint pursuit of truth are the characteristic expressions of Eros among philosophers who know how to “tame in their soul what was evil in it and have liberated that in which it is valour” (translation by W. Witwicki). [Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9 translated by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1925.] Drawing from different premises, Plato combines the concepts of “philosopher” and “Eros” in the Symposium. Since “Eros” is the love of what is beautiful, Eros must be a lover of wisdom, a “philosopher.”

The philosopher and death

8. And the philosopher’s attitude to death? Touching on this issue, Plato put forward one of the most critical problems of the so-called philosophy of life. At the core of all human endeavours and actions lies the instinct of life. Instinctively, every living being desires life and fears death. The instinct for power, the instinct for nourishment, the instinct for reproduction, the instinct for combat, and so on, are merely various offshoots of this fundamental will to live. In healthy individuals, this instinct usually operates subconsciously. In life-threatening situations, moments of weakness or exhaustion, the fear of death emerges, and against its background, an intensified struggle for life, either the overcoming of the instinct of life or a dilemma. Almost all religious systems and many philosophical systems are an unconscious or conscious reflection of man’s struggle against death. The almost universal belief in immortality and resurrection, the stoic theories of the eternal returns of the world, and the atomistics of the Epicureans all aim at the same goal: to remove or soothe the fear of death. Among the main tasks of philosophy, the Epicureans list liberating people from this soul-poisoning fear. Without explicitly naming it, others also find consolationem philosophiae in this field. Plato too has his philosophy of death. Starting from the premise that the world of empirical objects is only a reflection of the perfect world of ideas and that empirical knowledge based on sensory experience is illusory, superficial, imperfect knowledge, he sees in the sensory nature of man, which he identifies with the body, an obstacle to the soul in its cognitive activities. Death, being the destruction of the body - but not the soul - opens up to man the prospect of direct communion with the world of ideas, and for this reason, it is not something dreadful but rather desirable. However, it is also desirable for another reason: the thought of death can provide solace in a moral dilemma. Therefore, Plato holds it in reserve in numerous discussions on goodness and justice. It is only a pretence, says Plato, that it is better to have solid fangs and claws, to oppress others, and to inflict harm. It is a falsehood that what is just and unjust is determined by the will of the stronger and the biological interests of a more predatory individual or class. This pretence is created by the worldly successes of such types. In reality, it is better not to harm anyone. It is even better to suffer harm oneself than to inflict it on another. Justice is the inner harmony of a virtuous person: one who is self-disciplined, courageous, and wise. In life, such a person may encounter hatred, slander, and humiliation from others. These are apparent evils from which death will deliver them. Afterwards, somewhere on the bright shore of immortality, they will receive approval for their way of life. Therefore, the philosopher does not fear death; sometimes, he even desires it. And this is also a significant aspect of their character.

The inner freedom of the philosopher

9. Research work is a function of reason. Reason and the love of wisdom that reign in the human soul also leave their mark on the human’s entire inner life. They are what makes a philosopher prudently moderate, preventing them from being swayed in their actions by moods and passions, but rather, they exhibit moderation in all things, maintaining inner freedom through wise self-control. Plato, believing that research work and theoretical pursuits alone can shape a type of person in whom reason is the sole driving and regulating force in their actions, falls into a psychological error. Reason alone is not sufficient to prompt a man to act. Cognisant action is a means of achieving certain values, and the measure of values is the feelings connected with the thought of a particular state of affairs. Reason devises means of action, and reason critically evaluates values and goals, but the driving force of action remains feeling.

The philosopher and the state

10. Engrossed in research work and theoretical inquiry, a philosopher attaches less importance to practical life than other people. He is not curious about how the neighbours live, what prices prevail in the market, who is born to whom, or how much someone has and for what. Flute players and serenades are not on his mind. He is not seen in court or the agora. He does not interfere in politics; intrigues and power struggles are foreign to him. However, according to Plato, this negative attitude towards practical life is justified only within the framework of existing relationships, which do not allow a wise and selfless individual to influence the fate of society. In a state, as it should be, in a state with a healthy social system, a philosopher does not have to avoid public life. Furthermore, in such a state, political power should rest in the hands of the philosopher. Philosopher-rulers are one of the fundamental principles of Plato’s concept of the state, in which the ideal of the philosopher merges into one with the ideal of the politician (statesman). And this is where the fundamental difficulty arises. In Plato’s view, a philosopher is someone who cherishes truth. A theorist for whom the cognition of ideas is of the utmost importance. Not just cognition. By cognising an idea, and thus:

"the eternal and unchanging order; he will endeavour to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness (…)/ Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man (…) If, then some compulsion is laid upon him (…) to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there, and not merely to mould and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman of sobriety and justice and all forms of civic activity"[5].

[Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.]

In entrusting power to him in the state, Plato seems to forget that he himself instructs the rulers to deceive the citizens, to impose certain behaviours on them forcibly, and to eliminate unsuccessful offspring, all to ensure the proper functioning of the state apparatus. It is indeed difficult to imagine sincere scientific researchers and lovers of truth in such a role. When Plato writes about governance, when he revels in the thought of shaping people into a uniform, precisely functioning herd of producers and guardians, he embodies in his imagination another life ideal that he was familiar with in his youth: the ideal of a ruthless, strong ruler. An ideal only outwardly overcome by the influence of Socrates and his own inner struggle.

Further development of the Platonic ideal of the philosopher

11. Thus, from the memories of a disciple who was captivated by the personal charm of his teacher and from the psychological reflections of the thinker, a new ideal of life emerged in antiquity: the ideal of the philosopher. Over time, it was overshadowed by the ideal of the sage, developed in the Stoic and Epicurean schools. This ideal also grew from the Socratic trunk. In the memories of two other disciples of Socrates, the image of the teacher was portrayed somewhat more one-sidedly than in Plato’s recollections. Antisthenes and Aristippus also saw in Socrates an ideal of life, but not only for an elite group of scholarly researchers.

He embodied for them the mastery of life, based on freedom and inner independence, on wise self-control. Gazing upon this model, they sketched the ideal of a philosopher, emphasizing the wisdom of life, that peace and serenity which nothing and no one could disturb - neither the vicissitudes of fate, nor human violence, nor their unbridled impulses. The perfect cynic of the model of Antisthenes and the perfect hedonist of the model of Aristippus found their continuation, the former in the Stoic ideal, the latter in the Epicurean ideal of the sage.

A new modification of Plato’s ideal philosopher emerged in the 3rd century A.D. in the school of Neoplatonists. The life and works of Plotinus were guided by the ideal of a philosopher-lover of the idea of beauty. A true philosopher, according to the Ninth Book of the 5th Enneads, is one whose soul, by its very nature, capable of cognising the super-sensory world, enamoured of spiritual beauty and its foundations rooted in the divine first principle, and in painful yearning for that source, soars above the sensory world. Until it becomes silent in union with the Deity. This mystical concept, drawing on the analysis of Eros in Plato’s Symposium, opens the last phase in the development of the Platonic ideal of philosopher, a phase conditioned by the religious character of the intellectual currents of the Hellenistic era, an era that, in its quest for a new life model, discovered the ideal of holiness.

The text by Izydora Dąmbska was first published in “Meander” Vol. 4, 1949, z. 7, p. 325-334. We obtained permission for its publication from Professor Barbara Judkowiak. The editorial board of „Meander” also granted permission for its publication.

[1] The word rationalism has two meanings in the history of philosophy. In one, broader, it does not oppose empiricism, but irrationalism. In this sense, the term is used above to say that the fifth century B.C. was the century of rationalism. In the second, narrower sense, rationalism is an epistemological direction based on the assumption that not experience, but rational, a priori factors are the basis of knowledge. In this second sense, rationalism is the opposite of empiricism.

[2] This may be the case for doubt. How is it possible that before Plato, there was not this ideal in Greece, which had its seven sages and gnomic poets, Pythagorean scholars and natural philosophers and Parmenides? And the great cult of the intellect? We will answer - there were philosophers, and there was the concept, and perhaps the ideal, of the sage. And there was the word σοφός. This word had several meanings (five different ones are mentioned, for example, by W. Nestle in the beautiful book Vom Mythos zum Logos). One of these meanings contained elements characteristic of the concept of the philosopher, and therefore, they became part of the meaning of this new word φιλόσοφος. However, primo, the word philosopher (φιλόσοφος) really comes into use only in Socratic milieus– although according to tradition, it was already found among the Pythagoreans; secundo, rethinking the spiritual type of philosopher and constituting it in the sense of a model or ideal of life is the work of Socrates and Plato. The first one, because he developed this type through the practice of his life and sanctified it with his death, the second one, because he included it in the conceptual and literary canon.

[3] In this way, and not in the spirit of agnosticism – as is often done – one should understand the well-known saying of Socrates in the Platonic Apology (VI): "ἐγὼ δὲ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι".

[4] In Aristotle’s later works, from the Platonic concept retained were predominantly these particular traits of a researcher-theorist. In the third book of Metaphysics he wrote “Clearly then it is the function of the philosopher and that who explores the reality in its essential nature, to investigate also the principles of syllogistic reasoning. And it is proper for him who best understands each class of subject to be able to state the most certain principles of that subject; so that he who understands the modes of Being qua Being should be able to state the most certain principles of all things. Now this person is the philosopher”. (Metaphysics 1005) [Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.]

[5] (Editor's note) Plato's State, vol. 2, translated by Wł. Witwicki, Warszawa 1948, p. 37 (500cd). Witwicki translated Plato’s "συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς" as „all forms of civic virtue”. Dąmbska decided to modify the translation, choosing the version „all forms of civic activity”.