Even when we look back at the past, we view it from the perspective of the past future of that era; In which years are we living?
The answer seems obvious — in the 2020s. But to understand what sort of times these are, we draw on analogies from the past. In such cases, we usually go back a hundred years. And suddenly we find ourselves in those times.
Fascism lurks everywhere, round every corner, though it is not entirely clear who might be the new Hitler or Mussolini today. Even when we look back into the past, we view it from the perspective of that era’s ‘past future.’ The basis for this very interpretation of contemporary political events, which currently dominates in Europe, lies in the fate of Germany — as if it were obvious that modern liberal democracies would meet a similar fate to that of the Weimar Republic — not because of a coup d’état, not through external aggression, but through poor democratic choices and a lack of will, which will result in democracy lacking the democrats who would wish to defend it. That is why a ‘wehrhafte Demokratie’ – a ‘defensive democracy’ – is needed, along with a cordon sanitaire, a firewall to hold back the enemies of democracy. At the forefront of this movement to defend democracy stand such trustworthy figures as Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, Ursula von der Leyen, Donald Tusk and Péter Magyar. And only those of little faith believe that their primary concern is their own power and self-preservation.
/// Our history is an uncomfortable one; it does not fit neatly into the current EU philosophy of history. ///
Here in Poland, we naturally also draw on Polish history. We recall the decline of the First Republic – the political and institutional disintegration that made the task easier for the partitioning powers, the reform efforts, and the betrayal of the Targowica Confederation, as well as the year 1939. But our history is an uncomfortable one; it does not fit neatly into the current EU philosophy of history. From our perspective, the ‘enlightened absolutism’ of Prussia, Russia and Austria loses its lustre, whilst the end of the Second Polish Republic serves as a reminder that Europe’s current hegemon was once its executioner and has not yet fully accounted for its actions. Those who draw historical parallels with the 1920s and 1930s usually gloss over, with tactful silence, the fact that at that time in Western Europe, various forms of fascism and National Socialism clashed with communism of all stripes; that the Soviet Union was then the object of the yearnings and hopes of ‘progressive humanity’ and a key participant in that struggle. It was in this clash that parliamentary democracy fell. Fascism, in its various forms, flourished based on slogans calling for defence against communism and socialism. Let us recall that the seizure of power in Germany by communists and radical socialists was a real possibility after the First World War. Revolutionary aspirations were suppressed by force, but the Communist Party remained a significant political force – in November 1932, 6 million Germans (16.9 per cent) voted for it.
/// Many German communists also joined the National Socialist movement. They became members of the SA and the SS. The first head of the Gestapo, Rudolf Diels, even claimed that in Berlin, from January 1933 onwards, around 70 per cent of new SA recruits came from the ranks of the communists. ///
The situation was similar in Italy. The Socialists lacked the determination to seize power. In his book on Mussolini, which recently became a bestseller in Italy – “M.: The Man of the Century” – Antonio Scurati writes with regret: ‘The Italian Socialists put off their assault on the seat of power. In 1917 in Russia, it was all about storming the Winter Palace. The Bolsheviks, having overcome metre-high snowdrifts, rushed through the main doors of the Tsar’s residence without a moment’s hesitation to overthrow the tyranny. But in Italy, summer reigns supreme. In this country, potential turning points have always been thwarted by a carefree tendency to put things off: ‘Another time, comrades. Another time.’ The struggle between the Fascists and National Socialists on the one hand, and the Communists and Socialists on the other, was a bloody family feud. Scurati also recalls figures such as the communist and fascist Nicolino Bombacci, whose political and spiritual guides were Lenin and Mussolini. This ‘Lenin of Romagna,’ as he was known, was executed by firing squad alongside Mussolini, and his body was also displayed at a petrol station in Piazza Loreto in Milan.
Many German communists also joined the National Socialist movement. They became members of the SA and the SS. The first head of the Gestapo, Rudolf Diels, even claimed that in Berlin, from January 1933 onwards, around 70 per cent of new SA recruits came from the ranks of the communists. This is hardly surprising. The political similarities were evident. Both the KPD and the NSDAP were hostile towards the Weimar Republic and the SPD and competed for the same electorate — workers and the unemployed. At street level, there were frequent instances of fraternization, joint strikes (e.g., in 1932) or actions against the SPD (e.g., the Prussian referendum of 1931). As is well known, the Communists often brandished nationalist slogans. The KPD, too, announced in 1930 a ‘Programme for National and Social Liberation’ in 1930 to recruit radicals from the NSDAP and the SA. The fact that the boundaries were fluid is evidenced not only by the fact that communists became fascists, but also by the reverse evolution. The best-known example is Curzio Malaparte, author of *Kaputt* and *The Skin*, but there are other examples.
/// History speaks volumes, but it does not repeat itself. Not even as a farce. We do not live in the 1920s. We live in an era following the peaceful victory of left-wing forces. ///
Delio Cantimori, a leading left-wing intellectual, translator of Marx’s *Capital* and historian, was also a fascist in his youth. Similarly, the philosopher Ugo Spirito, one of the signatories of the 1925 ‘Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals’, became a communist after the war and even had the honour of meeting Nikita Khrushchev in 1956. Both collaborated with Giovanni Gentile, a left-wing Hegelian, and the most important philosopher of Italian fascism. Elio Vittorini, a writer well known in Poland, was also a left-wing fascist in the 1930s. He joined the underground Communist Party in 1942. After the war, he headed the Milan edition of *l’Unità*; he founded the influential magazine *Il Politecnico*. Another example of such an evolution is provided by the ‘red fascists’ (fascisti rossi) of the Republic of Salò, described in Paolo Buchignani’s book, a group centred around the journal *Il Pensiero Nazionale*. They subsequently regarded the Italian Communist Party as the best force to continue the anti-capitalist revolution that fascism had failed to achieve. And in that respect, they were probably right.
History speaks volumes, but it does not repeat itself. Not even as a farce. We do not live in the 1920s. We live in an era following the peaceful victory of left-wing forces. The left’s long march through the institutions culminated in their takeover and the ‘rule of minds’ in the West, thanks to their dominance of the media, culture, and universities. Contemporary right-wing protest movements and political parties are a reaction to the radicalism of nominally centrist elites, who have been implementing a left-wing agenda over recent decades. This is a policy that defies common sense – gender defined by self-declaration, upbringing without sexual orientation, a borderless Europe, the right to asylum as a human right, climate protection that completely disregards geopolitical realities and economic consequences, the trade in and production of children for same-sex ‘marriages,’ and the trampling of human dignity in the name of human dignity. Traditional conservative parties have become organisations devoid of ideology, intellectually and morally helpless, mere springboards for careerists hungry for government posts.
When liberal democracy became a democracy for left-wing liberals, people with more conservative or simply moderate views and attitudes drifted towards parties and associations that were labelled as extremist because they reject this worldview and took up the fight to wrest power from the left. It is there that one can find the ideas, views and attitudes once espoused and promoted by de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Kohl. They are fighting not against democracy, but against the ideological monopoly of the liberal left within democracy.
Although we must not turn a blind eye to the fact that in these circles — particularly in Germany — slogans and views are emerging that may give cause for concern, it is characteristic that today it is the Left that arouses greater fear in Jewish communities in France or Germany than the far Right, which consistently renounces violence and anti-Semitism. It is no coincidence that the debate in the Bundestag on the threat posed by anti-Semitism and the attitude of Berlin’s ‘Die Linke’ – which won the elections in that city – towards the law enforcement agencies took place at the request of the AfD. The pro-Russian stance of the Western European right, which we find so irritating, stemmed from the belief that Russia defends traditional principles of social life and Christianity.
/// The Polish political elite – the majority of whom are not on the right – have been and remain unquestioningly tied to foreign decision-making centers. ///
The Western culture war has reached Poland. Until recently, Poland served as a model for dissidents in Western Europe, exemplifying a combination of economic success (despite all the costs of post-communist transition) and tradition. Poland’s success only became more widely known after the fall of the PiS government, when it was finally possible to write and speak favorably about our country in the Western media. But such an enclave of traditionalism, common sense and a lack of multiculturalism cannot exist at the heart of modern Europe. As far as political control is concerned, the matter is simpler. The Polish political elite – the majority of whom are not on the right – have been and remain unquestioningly tied to foreign decision-making centers. They know that their role is merely to implement directives. When it was necessary to come to terms with Russia, they did so (even though Russia was not a source of positive role models for us); when it was necessary to recognize same-sex marriages, they went along with it. Recently, Donald Tusk even struck an anti-Israeli tone, just in case.
The situation is worse, however, with an unenlightened public that lays claim the freedom of democratic choice. That is why efforts to raise awareness amongst Poles are so intensive. One of the tools is popular culture, such as Netflix series, which have become a medium for an entire generation. When international productions – which promoted, more or less subliminally, a new set of ethics and customs – proved insufficient, attention turned to Polish history and Polish classics. However, the latest spectacular attempt – the series *Lalka* – met with extremely negative reactions. The failure is even more painful given that the almost simultaneous Polish film adaptation moved audiences with a traditionally told story of such a ‘reactionary’ sentiment as the mad, romantic love of a man for a woman. In an ironic twist of fate, the film version featured a host of older-generation actors, members of elite circles who have for years looked to ‘Europe.’ The fronts emerging ever more clearly in this culture war are political in nature, but do not entirely coincide with party divisions. Not only because even on the right we find many people who are shrewd and eloquent, yet uncivilized and indecent, but because not everyone realizes that this clash is of fundamental importance and requires a great deal of work, knowledge and many talents to win it.
The column was published in the weekly magazine “Tygodnik Solidarność”/ No. 43, 2026.











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