Why should statesmen rule in the European Union?
The thesis of the text is the claim that the European Union, like other political communities, should be managed by statesmen. Statesmen have some things in common with philosophers, but they are not philosophers, nor are they experts who limit their knowledge to a narrow range of specialized expertise. However, in order to begin the argument, one must first ask the question who exactly is a statesman. The intuition related to this concept is formulated by John Rawls, who in Law of Peoples writes "The ideal of the statesman is suggested by the saying: the politician looks to the next election, the statesman to the next generation” (1).
There is no such thing as the office of statesman. Democratic countries have presidents, chancellors and prime ministers representing entire communities. It is even more difficult to talk about a statesman in relation to the European Union, which does not have one person who represents the Union understood as a whole. There is no official title of President of the European Union, but there are several presidents of the European Union institutions, including: President of the European Council (from 1 December 2019 Charles Michel), President of the European Commission (from 1 December 2019 Ursula von der Leyen), President European Parliament (from 11 January 2022 Roberta Metsola) At the same time, however, a statesman is a kind of ideal politician. This text is devoted to the reconstruction of this ideal.
The thesis that statesmen should act in the European Union is supported by three main arguments: the first points to the limitations of the modern model of philosophy. These limitations mean that philosophers have lost the competences assigned to them in ancient times. The second argument refers to the model of expert knowledge created in modern times, the third points to the benefits of basing public and political activity on the activity of a statesman.
/// Why shouldn't the modern European Union be governed by philosophers? ///
Plato already pointed out the political consequences of philosophical knowledge. Perhaps it is enough to turn to the concept of the rule of philosophers, well founded in the European tradition? This would be supported by the fact that knowledge is available to only a few, and states should be ruled by wise people. In ancient times, those who possessed this type of knowledge were called philosophers. Today, instead of this term, we would probably use a more precise term: experts. Plato, however, did not yet differentiate between philosophy and expertise. He claimed that most people follow emotions or the desire to stand out. More importantly, however, the rationality of actions is conditioned by knowledge of the good.
Meanwhile, most people do not know what is good for themselves, much less what is good for the entire political community. People often want to achieve the goal of happiness, but they end up with completely different consequences. However, Plato's most important argument, indicating that philosophers should rule political communities, arose from the analysis of the case of Socrates. It was in a democracy that the majority sentenced to death Socrates, the wisest and best man Plato knew. Since the majority turned out to be not only unreasonable, but even hostile to reason, since they were able to kill someone who had harmed no one, then only a few wise people, that is, philosophers, should be in power.
In Plato's approach, philosophers are distinguished primarily by the fact that they describe reality in terms of what is permanent and unchanging. Such a person can always see what is beautiful and just, regardless of changing conditions, and is therefore also able to establish beautiful and just institutions and legal norms and maintain the established ones. Plato considers philosophers to be ideal leaders because they know reality and have knowledge about people and their true good and happiness (2).
The category of theoretical reason assumes that reality itself is constant, unchanging, objective and hidden under the surface of variable and subjective phenomena. Most remain at the level of phenomena, not reaching the essence of things, not understanding the relationships between ideas. The philosopher seeks the truth, not stopping at opinions. Most people cannot, they are stuck in a fictional world defined by their senses, and their knowledge is based on opinions. They do not know themselves and do not know what is good for them.
Importantly, Plato links knowledge understood as reaching the essence of reality with action. Rational knowledge can be transformed into a purpose for action that is good when it involves the pursuit of rationally good goals. In this way, in Plato's approach, theoretical knowledge of the good leads to the realization of the good in specific actions, and therefore is realized in the changing circumstances of material life and is linked to individual motivation. No one who is not capable of knowing the good cannot realize it on his own. All this speaks to the power exercised by philosophers. Philosophers are not only capable of knowing and realizing the good, but they can also guide the actions of others. "Philosopher-kings" are those who love the sight of truth (3). If a philosopher ruled the community, people would realize their true goods despite individual cognitive limitations - everyone would be better and happier in such a country.
“Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils—no, nor the human race, as I believe—and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.” Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon.” (4)
The modern approach to statesmanship retains many elements from Plato's analysis. He recognizes that some people see further and clearer and admits that they can draw others along with them. Currently, however, it would be difficult to identify this type of special competences with the figure of a philosopher. Modern philosophy has severed the connection between cognition and action. She distinguished the domain of scientific knowledge and moral knowledge. None of them teaches how to choose wisely between goods and how to be guided by the common good.
/// Why shouldn't the European Union be run by experts? ///
The turning point was the Enlightenment, which distinguished the sphere of theoretical knowledge, which took the form of scientific knowledge. The process of cognition should be directed towards the empirically known and rationally reconstructed external world, while good and beauty began to be understood as determined by the individual will. Good thus lost its connection with knowledge and became united with will or preference. Reducing good to an object of individual choice actually eliminated the possibility of referring to the common good, unless it was understood as an overlapping consensus of goods indicated individually. From now on, it is no longer possible to act as a statesman, as he is immediately faced with the accusation of paternalism. In short, Plato may have called upon philosophers to rule, but these philosophers had knowledge of the good. After the Enlightenment's criticism of metaphysics, good was somehow privatized and lost its rational character, which made it impossible to manage the community based on authority based on special knowledge about the goals pursued. As a result, a wide range of disagreements developed in the axiologically oriented sphere of freedom.
However, the Enlightenment also opened a new dimension to political knowledge, which could become scientific knowledge and the subject of expertise. (5) This was accompanied by great hope to build value-free and fact-based political knowledge. Instead, expert knowledge revealed its limitations. The expert opinions turned out to be possible within a narrow scope, they showed trust and at the same time revealed problems with possible economic pressure. As a result of the development of the Enlightenment edifice of knowledge, instead of a coherent whole, we received increasingly limited fields. Knowledge has become narrow and specialized. Thus, it became dependent on trust in experts and scientific institutions. The phrase “epistemic dependence” was first used by Hardwig (1985) to refer to our dependence on others for testimonial knowledge (6). Even experts often cannot evaluate each other's research, and peer reviews are no longer based solely on expertise, but also on trust in scientific journals and scientific institutions. Due to narrow specialization, it is difficult to find two experts in the same field of knowledge. In this way, the expert-ignorant relationship becomes a fundamental relationship not only in the public social sphere, but also in the world of science. Trust in an expert or expert institution has become the basic unit of science.
The problem of trust and cognition based on social cooperation was first noticed by Michael Polanyi (7). An issue that may raise concerns among citizens in the context of democracy is the functioning of experts in the public space, but without social supervision. Politicians are often responsible for selecting experts, who will then use their advice and analyses. The consequence of such action will be a different recognition of experts by citizens, which will result in a different degree of acceptance of expert opinions by society. However, the most uncertain in this type of expert bodies are sponsored experts who will lobby for solutions that are beneficial to given market entities and at the same time influence political life. The type of institutionalized public space thus created takes us into the sphere of the relationship between expertise and politics and economics.
All these problems with expertise (specialization, the issue of trust and the threat of economic pressure) lead to a fundamental issue, namely the separation of expertise and action. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant writes: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more consistently one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. (8)”. Contrasting the starry sky above me and the moral law within me, Kant distinguishes two fundamentally different orders. The first to which the starry sky refers is determined by the universally binding laws of nature. Man is subject to them as an animal being, he is determined by them. It is an ordinary element of nature. On the other hand, reason is the source of freedom and the rights that man gives to himself. Man is therefore also absolutely free. These two dimensions lead to different conclusions. The laws of nature point to universal determinism and human dependence on nature, the laws of reason for autonomy and elevation above the order of nature. In this apparent contradiction, it is precisely this particular anthropological human nature that is realized, which is defined as the dignity of man and can be analyzed from a juridical-natural perspective, the natural element of which does not exhaust.
The overlap between what is determined and what is decided makes it very difficult to separate one sphere from the other. An expert can manipulate a politician by pointing out common needs, while a politician can abuse his expertise, pretending that he can shape reality without any restrictions. This juxtaposition of the materialistic determinism of the natural world with the autonomy of the will does not allow for a clear separation of these two spheres (9). A similar dualism blurs the boundaries and both dimensions overlap. And just as an individual can be described as primarily an element of a determined world, an organism driven by impulses and desires, the natural world can also appear as an object of influence of autonomous will. Both descriptions, on the one hand, correspond to the logic of science and the logic of subjectivity, but on the other hand, they do not allow for integration and coherence (10).
/// Why should statesmen rule in the European Union? ///
A way to overcome the problems associated with the Enlightenment's separation of the cognitive and moral orders may be a partial return to philosophy, a return to the category of practical reason, and at the same time a reconstruction of the ideal of a statesman. However, a theoretical framework is necessary that would enable us to again refer to authority based on knowledge of the good. Two contemporary authors - John Finnis and Martha Nussbaum - going beyond the tension between knowledge and freedom based on dignity, reach for the category of practical reason(11). Using their concepts, it is possible to indicate the theoretical framework in which the ideal of a politician understood as a statesman can be set. A statesman is a politician who acts according to practical reason.
The category of practical reason refers to the Platonic connection between knowledge and action and finds expression in Aristotle's thought. Practical reasoning is the ability to analyze the consequences of actions and make decisions based on their expected long-term effects. Actions assessed from this perspective may be more or less rational. They are more rational when they serve to achieve selected goals, and less rational when they do not lead to these goals. However, from the perspective of practical rationality, goals can also be better or worse. The best ones constitute a list of goods.
"A truly human life", according to both Finnis and Nussbaum, consists in the possibility of realizing goods, which leads to a happy, fulfilled life. However, if we consider human goods as an objective object of knowledge and at the same time a goal of action, then political activity may support or violate the goods understood in this way. However, it is not up to politicians to judge what is good and what is bad, the list of goods is objectively given, and politicians are faced with the task of realizing specific goods in the specific conditions of the materially conditioned world.
The category of practical rationality thus moves the public debate from the level of expert knowledge and individual and collective decisions to the issue of universal quality of life that every citizen can achieve thanks to politics. John Finnis and Martha Nussbaum adopt the concept of goods from ancient classical philosophy, i.e. goals cognizable through reason, the implementation of which contributes to improving the quality of life. And although the lists of these goods differ from each other, they are accompanied by similar argumentation. Finnis's basic goods are: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion (12). Martha Nussbaum considers central human functional capabilities such as: life, bodily health and integrity, senses with imagination and thought), emotions, practical reason, affiliation, relation to other species, play and control (political, material) over one's environment (13). Nussbaum's list is therefore slightly longer and refers not to the category of goods, but to capabilities.
The difference between goods and abilities is also reflected in the application of practical rationality. In Finnis's approach, first of all, the law should be practically rational. The task of law is therefore the realization of human goods. Nussbaum, however, talks about abilities and sees potential tasks for politicians. It is on the basis of the theory of capabilities that the need to return to the statesman model can be justified. The role of a statesman is not the direct implementation of human goods, but the care of creating such conditions that everyone can realize human goods themselves. Hence the category of abilities indicated by Nussbaum. In the area of objectively distinguished spheres of typically human activity, according to philosophy, individuals should achieve the greatest independence. The task of a statesman is to create such material conditions that the goods can actually be realized by citizens.
As a result, the theoretical framework outlined by John Finnis and Martha Nussbaum allows for discussions about the quality of political actions. They allow us to outline the horizon of political activity and distinguish a statesman from an ordinary politician. A statesman does not only look to the next generation, while a politician focuses on the next election (14). A statesman contributes to improving the quality of life in the foreseeable future. Finally, a statesman does not deprive citizens of their due autonomy. He does not become a paternalistic authoritarian leader but enables an increasingly wider group of citizens to live truly human lives.
The last element worth paying attention to is the shift of emphasis from governing for the European Union to governance in. Human goods/capabilities also include control over political actions. This is one of the abilities whose importance is especially emphasized by Martha Nussbaum. An individual can control the political realm when it is as close and local as possible. The category of practical rationality therefore leads towards the principle of subsidiarity understood as making political decisions not only aimed at the effective and long-term creation of conditions for the implementation of a fulfilled and flourishing human life, but also at expanding the sphere of agency. This is served by Nussbaum's introduction of the category of abilities and the assignment of political activity to the citizen himself. Therefore, a statesman can represent the political community and be accountable to it for his actions. Transferring the level of political representation from the state to the European Union leads to a loss of agency, reduce representativeness and responsibility for political actions. The postulated statesman should therefore act in the European Union, not rule it.
Agnieszka Nogal, professor at the University of Warsaw
Head of Political Philosophy Dept.
The article was published in the book *Should Philosophers Govern the European Union?*, edited by Professor Zdzisław Krasnodębski; Wydawnictwo Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, OMP, 2025.
(1) John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. With "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" ,Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2000, p. 97
(2) Plato, The Republic, The Republic, transl. Benjamin Jowett, Vintage Books, New York 1991, 520 E–521 B.
(3) Plato, The Republic, The Republic, transl. Benjamin Jowett, Vintage Books, New York 1991, 475 C.
(4) Plato, The Republic, The Republic, transl. Benjamin Jowett, Vintage Books, New York 1991, book V, 473 C-E.
(5) More on the application of expert knowledge, especially in relation to the politics of the European Union, in: Agnieszka Nogal, Problem of Expertise in Nowadays Europe, [In:] The spiritual State of Europe, ed. Zdzisław Krasnodębski, OMP, Kraków 2022, p. 184-201
(6) John Hartwig, “Epistemic dependence”, “The Journal of Philosophy” 1985, no 82 (7), p. 335-349; idem , “Role of Trust in Knowledge”, “The Journal of Philosophy”, 1991, no 88 (12), p. 693-708
(7) Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards Post-Critical Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2005. p. 400
(8) Immanuel Kant,,Critique of Practical Reason, tr. M. J. Gregor, Cabridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, p. 129.
(9) More about Kantian dualism Agnieszka Nogal, Narodziny biopolityki i kryzys praw człowieka. Obrona praktycznej racjonalności jako podstawy prawa, Wydawnictwo Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, Warsaw 2023, p. 251-253
(10) John Finnis Duties to Oneself in Kant, [w:] Human Rights and Common Good. Collected Essays: Volume III, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, s. 47-71, s.70
(11) The theory of John Finnis (born 1940) has been developing since the 1980s. He expressed his fundamental views on practical reason and human goods in the book Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press Oxford 1980. Philosophy of Martha Nussbaum also found recognition in the 1980s. In 1986, a text on the ethics of ancient Greece and Greek tragedy was published The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986.
(12) John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1980, p. 86-89
(13) The list of capabilities appears already in an article from 1988 - M. Nussbaum,Non‐Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, "Midwest Studies in Philosophy", 13 (1) 1988, pp. 32-53. Then it is duplicated in many places, but also partially modified. For example, in the first versions, instead of the life, Nussbaum indicates death. Later, she expands the list with attitude towards other species and control over the environment. The presented list corresponds to the one presented in the text by M. Nussbaum,Sex and social justice, New York 1999, s. 41-42.
(14) John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. With "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2000, s. 97
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