Science and Barbarism

Science and Barbarism[I]
[1930]

Into a blind darkness they enter who follow after the Ignorance, into a greater darkness who devote themselves to the Knowledge alone.

Iśa-Upanishad, 9

Perhaps it is an unpedagogical and condemnable act: to break away with reservations about science in a country where there are still so many people to whom the simplest understanding of science needs to be fought for. Not to mention that such educational measures are probably not required for the audience for whom this article is intended; after all, it is difficult to reconcile that, due to the grumblers of thought, we should be prevented from discussing the most important matters and turn Polish theoretical literature into some eternal kindergarten. This modest remark may be enough to shield me from too harsh condemnations for the real or imaginary weapon given to ignorance; however, the decisive reason I embark on my considerations without too much concern is that their blade is only very indirectly directed against science itself. That blade is indeed directed against a certain, not inconsiderable fraction of scientists, as well as - and I do not wish to deny this - a certain one-sided cult of science; however, it is directed against science itself only in so far as its disproportionate development at the expense of other forms of human creativity may, in the epoch in which we live, have created a favourable ground for certain phenomena criticised here.

There are two groups of people who see negative features in science. For someone primarily interested in the proper cognitive issue, the very image of the world provided by science seems imperfect: some consider it too schematic, others adapted only to the needs and requirements of practice, and some see it as if obtained by a kind of negation of the subject whose understanding was the goal, or simply as failing to grasp the essential „reality”; these are the objections of Bergson and other irrationalists, partly Hegel, and directions stemming from Hegel. Others would suspect it rather of having a bad influence on human spirituality: they speak of dulling sensitivity, narrowing the horizon of scientific specialisation, cutting off the instincts necessary for life and creativity, and finally, that this exclusive love for truth, which scholars boast about, may too often obscure a rather timid escape from living issues, everything that is disturbing and fertile, the depths of life and its seriousness. This group of accusers are the philosophers of culture; as there Bergson, so here perhaps Nietzsche gave the formulas most explicitly. The objections put forward below - although their theoretical starting point is polar opposite to the Nietzschean one - are of the latter type: the sins they reproach scholars with are sins against culture[II].

Twice now, I have used the word „culture”; it signifies the central concept for the outline of this essay, and it is difficult for me not to explain the meaning in which I intend to use it. Unfortunately, the first clarification will entail the necessity of several other, more intricate explanations, and even though in an essay like this, which cannot delve into the core of every issue, it is dangerous to reach for the ultimate, always controversial and difficult matters, it is fair for us to forget about safety in the interest of clarity of exposition. By culture I mean the sum total of things whose creation lies within the realm of human capability, and which are things of value[III]; but the concept of value introduced by this definition into the sphere of considerations can itself be understood in various ways. Every day, one can encounter the opinion that things become valuable through some relation they have to us, and among the more commonly held views on what such a relationship might be, there is the one that sees it in „utility” or „usefulness”, or slightly differently, in the fact that the thing „satisfies our needs”. Whoever takes the essence of value in this way would also have to understand our definition of culture so that it is the sum of possible products of human activity that satisfy their needs: a complete misalignment with what we intended to say. We, in fact, understood value as something independent of us and any relationship between us and the object, something that would be inherent in the object even if it existed alone in the world. This distinction was necessary because it is only with this second view that all the conclusions we will pursue here are possible and make sense. If the whole meaning of culture lies in the fact that it satisfies our needs, we shall never in any way show that it should rather be than not be; for there is no shadow of reason to be seen that the needs of the Homo species should rather be satisfied than those of the Felis tigris or Taenia echinococcus species. It is an entirely different matter when we reduce culture to absolute values. A thing endowed with such a value can no longer be or not be without detriment; such a thing should be[1]; it is an inherent property inseparable from its concept, and if it is to exist, it should also be, to the extent of our human ability, brought into existence, „created”, as the colloquial expression goes. And if culture is a complex of such things, it is no longer a question of whether we are free to create it or not; creating it is now, firstly, our duty - because it encompasses only values that are within our power to create; secondly, our sole duty[2], because it encompasses them all. And that would be our conclusion: culture as an obligation and imperative, the purpose and calling of man, a dome whose pillars we should consider ourselves and others, our life, and our actions.

There remains a difficulty - a not inconsiderable difficulty, putting an ironic end to the most modest attempt at pathos: are such independent values something that really exists? If not, then the conclusion collapses as well, and who knows whether one will not come to agree that such a negative answer is the one most commonly heard in philosophical circles today. However, despite everything its supporters can cite in its favour, the affirmative answer seems to have stronger arguments behind it. I can neither cite them here nor, still less, examine the degree of their strength: let me only state here, as is necessary for the continuation of these deliberations, that there is no question of any proof of the negative thesis and that in the worst case, the matter is simply doubtful. And this is entirely sufficient for us since - contrary to the well-known and otherwise sound principle of practical wisdom - doubt is here a sufficient basis for producing what we are after; the injunction not to abstain, but to act. For the point - if I understand it correctly - is as follows. If we refrain from creating culture, there will be no culture: no one will bring it out from non-existence on our behalf. If we choose to create it, then even then, we will not be sure whether we have created real culture or just its semblance because the values revealed in it may be pure fantasy on our part; however, they might not be, and in that case, the effort we had undertaken in their service indeed led us to the goal, and the edifice constructed in the name of our untested hope really stood. Therefore, in the case of effort, there are chances of creating culture; in the case of refraining from effort, there are none. The conclusion can only be one: make the effort. Of course, there is a risk in this: because if we are mistaken, if there is no support for our edifice in the world beyond us, then all our work is in vain: we hang in the void with our creation, and our toil and effort have gone to waste. Accepting the risk, accepting the fact that we may be building in the air and erecting a delusional edifice on a delusional foundation, is the sacred duty of every conscious co-creator of culture, and at the same time, their dignity and virtue: like a metaphysician or mystic, they throw their whole life before them, not knowing whether they are throwing it into a void or onto the foundation of something eternal. A virtue, let us add in passing, sharply contrasting them with the type embodied in the scholar: for the duty of the latter is not to build when the foundation is even slightly doubtful. But about scholars, their psychology, and their interests – in just a moment; to delve into them more closely, we must first state some implications of what we have established so far.

They are, in fact, clear as a day. One cannot consciously create valuable things without issuing appropriate judgments that „value” or, more simply, „evaluate” (both of these words mean the same thing)[3]. As soon as we make such judgements, we must protect ourselves from error and ensure their correctness no less than in our other cognitive activities; this again is followed by the necessity of a method no less strict in their formulation. If, for whatever reason, we do not wish to issue them at all, we will lack a model and a plan according to which we can create culture; if we issue them, but immethodically and erroneously, our culture will also be a mistake. To evaluate and elaborate our evaluations, then, are the two derived injunctions which the duty to create culture entails: and now we reach the point where the concrete matter we intended to discuss here finally hooks up with these questions of value. For if this is the case, any force that seeks to dissuade us from making judgements or developing them is, to the extent that it does so, a threat against culture. And there are no small number of such forces. One of them, and not the least powerful, is the passive resistance of those people who, in the hierarchy of values, if it were to be conducted in earnest, would find themselves on levels little flattering to their self-love; it is in the interests of these possible victims of the hierarchy that judgements about value should not be made[IV]. But this force, quite simply, cannot act on its own behalf and would be eternally doomed to defend itself by mere inertia if there were no allies fighting in the name of slogans more worthy, which can be taken as their own without shame. A façade-saving ally to what is worse, for example, is found in extreme forms of democracy; the well-known tendency in every grand idea to expand and generalise without measure appears in them as a drive to abolish all possible hierarchies in all possible areas - and thus also in the most important one we are discussing at the moment. But this factor is too tangible and has already been brought into the light too often for it to be worth thinking about once more. Less tangible at first glance, and therefore all the more worthy of investigation, are those circumstances by which the least seemingly susceptible power is drawn into this infamous alliance: science itself, which reaches its highest heights only through the human will to culture.

To understand the possible conflicts between scientific thinking and evaluative thinking[v], it is first necessary to realise that these are indeed two different, self-contained forms of thinking. Undoubtedly, this truth is not always sufficiently recognised; we must therefore recall not only the truth itself, but also, however briefly, the rationale that imposes it on us. The difference in question does not lie in the manner in which, from the already obtained statements accepted as the basis of reasoning, further statements are derived; evaluative thinking does not exhibit specific forms of inference. It differs all the more from scientific thinking by the nature of the initial statements, which are not deductions, „fundamental” in the full sense. In science, these statements are either perceptual-sensory, or perceptual-introspective, or finally, a priori; in evaluative thinking - excluding this or that auxiliary axiom, which is a priori but not an evaluation - they belong to a completely different category, not falling into any of the three mentioned. They are not a priori; on the contrary, in some broad sense, they could be called empirical: on the basis of contact with a thing, they conclude that it is such and such, good or bad, beautiful or ugly. However, they are not perceptive either, and in neither of the two possible varieties: values are established neither through the senses nor through introspection. To define them, there is nothing else to do but to use an unsatisfactory term, but one that can provide an approximate indication, and to call them intuitive. Intuition is at the basis of valuation: to establish and strengthen the foundations of a valuing discipline is to develop not perceptions or introspective data, not even - in the main part of the task - a priori data, but intuitions. The main activities of the mind required, on the one hand, in science, and on the other hand, in evaluation, are therefore different, and this difference is deepened by numerous experiences accompanying proper thinking, shaping two independent variations not only of intellects but also of people, clearly distinguished from each other.

From this difference, among other things, it follows that no goal requiring valuation can be achieved by means of science alone; thus, it is also insufficient for establishing culture, and that, were it not for its own need to be based on the will of culture, its most splendid development could coexist with undisturbed barbarism. However, we did not aim for this, albeit significant, outcome while distinguishing our two forms of thinking. As mentioned, our goal was to demonstrate that conflicts are possible between them; and the first condition for this was to establish that they are two things not identical with each other. The second condition will be fulfilled if we demonstrate that in the event of their meeting in one mind, one can influence the other, and that in the interest of audacity and effectiveness of thinking, it may be necessary to suppress one of them. Individuals in whose minds such a meeting can take place are, by nature, only scholars; as for the reasons why evaluative thinking may interfere with scientific thinking - which is the only case that concerns us here - it seems that we can mention two; all others, sometimes mentioned, are irrelevant.

The first would be the difficulty, given the existing difference, of mastering both forms of thinking in their finite and methodical form equally and evenly. It is by no means impossible: with the appropriate effort, one can develop both skills in oneself, whether like an artist who sometimes practices two arts, dedicating one’s energies to science and evaluation alternately, or merging them into some complex discipline, a scientific-evaluative one, such as the humanistic disciplines are and in some of their branches must be. But such a doubled task requires doubled effort, so even for the most experienced minds, it may be more advisable to give up one of the two skills in favour of excelling in the other. And this would be one collision, limited in its effects to the extent that, because of it, the individual renounces not judging in general and the forms of life connected with judging but only the more special activity of methodical cooperation in the creation of a system of values. But here is what in its consequences goes deeper, into the very substance of humanity. A thing considered valuable - I want to say, positively valuable - is not necessarily, but nevertheless, for the general public and with a normal reaction, a thing that one desires to realise, and vice versa: a negative value is usually feared. So, someone who issues judgments, even if they have no knowledge of what interest or passion is, does not differ from a person of interest or passion at least in one respect: they desire certain things to exist and certain things not to exist, for facts to be a certain way, and not otherwise. And if such a person cannot keep their desires in check, there is a threat, just like with the others, that these desires will truly blind them, that they will be ready to acknowledge facts or not acknowledge them, depending on the degree of their conformity with what these desires dictate. Such an attitude to truth, in turn, is one of the gravest offences a man of science can commit, and therefore, he has reason, on a par with interest and passion, to fear valuation as a third equal temptation. Here again, as with the first conflict, the difficulty is not insurmountable: from the ego, there is self-criticism and moral discipline to contain and neutralise the influence of desire on cognitive activity. However, in that case, it becomes an enormous additional burden that the scholar, alongside so many others, takes upon themselves. No wonder, then, that they sometimes prefer to stop looking at things from the perspective of good and beauty altogether and pluck out the eye that troubles them rather than multiply their toil and torment by contact with this dangerous world. This would be the second conflict, undoubtedly much more dangerous: for here, in the interest of science, we condemn ourselves to something more than giving up a certain skill; here, we impoverish ourselves as human beings, mutilate ourselves completely. In this way, evaluative thinking is often expelled from the mind and life of the individual by scientific thinking.

How does this phenomenon, so specific and confined to such small circles, manage to extend itself into the collective domain? Only through psychological processes. The suppression of evaluative thinking, if practised at all, the scholar has the right to consider only for their personal hygiene associated with their vocation; nothing could be further from correctness than moving from here to general prohibitions and condemnations, demanding the same sacrifice from people whose life’s content is not about understanding. All too often, however, it is the other way round: the suppression of evaluative thinking in oneself leads many scholars to its unconditional condemnation, which they then quite naturally - in matters so general, everyone tends to proclaim loudly - pass on to others as a principle.

There is, of course, no sensible reason for this; none of the reasons for renouncing evaluation speaks in favour of despising it. But, as we know, in human matters, often the least sensible reason is the one that actually acts as a motive; and under the influence of various irrational factors – be they subtle and vital psychological necessities or downright trivial weaknesses - this also happens in our case. The choice of one speciality rather than another, affined and competitive, should not lead to contempt for the one left aside; in reality, however, no less naively than a sea wolf - wandering on land, a tennis player - playing soccer, or many an author of mediocre dramas - writing even the best novels, a scholar can sometimes hold in disdain any mode of thinking other than his own, simply because he chose science: and that would be the first, quite uninteresting but often essential source of his negative feelings. Not much more interesting is the further source. When, of two things that are close to each other, one is valuable, nothing dishonourable results from it for the other; however, differently thinks that strange, perpetually looming intellectual simplism, thanks to which a scholar sometimes likes to think: scientific thinking is valuable, so evaluative thinking is something devoid of reason and sense. More serious is the third reason; fortunately for the honour of scholars, it seems to be the chief reason - but even here, rationality is not known. The fact that a thing hinders us in the attainment of some special goals of limited importance does not make it an absolute evil; however, since to exert the effort necessary for its rejection, the conviction of its partial harmfulness is hardly ever a strong enough stimulus, we readily energise ourselves in such a way that we simply tell ourselves of this absolute negativity: and this is what those who are hindered by it also do with evaluation. So, having arrived on the irrational paths at their great contempt, the scholar takes the reasoned justification for it from a theory, one of many, according to which a value judgment is „subjective”, „arbitrary”, „impossible to justify”, always equally valid or invalid, and whatever these stricter or less strict formulations may sound, the precise meaning of which the non-specialist, wielding them like slogans and not definitions, cares little about. In doing so, the scholar harms himself: by negatively evaluating evaluative thinking, they thereby negatively evaluate their own positive evaluation of scientific thinking, but this consequence, so striking to the eye, strangely enough, tends to remain beyond the field of the scholar’s vision. On the contrary, all too often, we see how he more or less consciously, sometimes by word, more often by example, imposes his prejudices on laymen who do not have the same special interests in the matter as he does and either tries to convince them not to evaluate at all, or tells them more or less as follows: as those who are not called to higher cognitive tasks, play, if you like, this harmless game of grades, as long as you do not take it seriously, and do not try, God forbid, to justify or elaborate your grades or to treat them with any method. The latter attitude is worse because it brings demoralisation and decay into the most important area of life, but both are dangerous for culture because each damages one of the necessary conditions for its realisation.

It is in this way that the scholar can become a kind of spokesman for barbarism in the collective arena; however, to understand why this may be dangerous today, we must consider another important factor: the degree of the scholar's influence on the general public. The whole thing remains harmless as long as this influence operates within the boundaries set by their essential competence; beyond these boundaries, proper authorities come to the fore. We all know that such a state of affairs is possible: in many epochs - even those in which science flourished - it fulfilled its function without encroaching on powers not its own, and it never occurred to anyone to grant it any final word regardless of the nature of the issues. But we also know that this state of affairs is not the only possible one: sometimes - as a result of shifts, the mysterious mechanism of which is not the place to try to unravel - it can happen that reverence for science leads to its being assigned a leading and guiding role and that a permanent dominance, a hegemony of science in culture is created. This is a fatal dominance for culture: then even the aberrations of the learned, when embraced by the masses, become a model, and when these aberrations concern the very foundations of culture, barbarism may loom on the threshold: the doors are more than halfway open. Indeed, such dominance has become evident in the modern era after the Renaissance. The elite of this period were dazzled and captivated by the theoretical development of science, which began as early as the 17th century and, in the last hundred years, has been accelerating at a truly dizzying pace; the general public fell in awe of the wonders of its applications; the general public, like the elite, became more serious about it than probably at any time in history. It is nowadays - in Western countries more obviously than in Poland, whose separate conditions were the source of our hesitations at the outset - a conviction that is both widespread and vital in a special way, that science is not one of the branches of culture, but its chief department, or indeed that all culture can be identified with science. A kind of religion of science has been formed and, against all resistance, is generally developing and spreading, and in connection with this, the authority of scientists is going further and further beyond the limits in which it is a legitimate authority. And here is the reason why, also in the matter of evaluative thought, the influence of scholars finds such fertile ground: their intervention in favour of barbarism becomes effective only through their leadership in culture.

The havoc wreaked by this - for to speak of havoc here is perhaps little more than an exaggeration - I will not describe in detail. So far, they have been most profound in the area of artistic life; here, disbelief in the scale of values has already managed to get into our blood and sense of feeling, and not only eclectic audiences but sometimes even artists themselves are thrown off guard. In the field of ethics, on the other hand, the matter is somewhat masked by the existence of a group of norms and rules that are commonly included in this area and which resist unbreakable levelling influences; these are all the - practically so important - norms and rules dictated to the collective benefit, in the general opinion constituting the core of the so-called social ethics. For us, however, in accordance with the position we formulated at the outset, this so-called ethics, precisely concerning utility, consists of a set of judgments not about value but something fundamentally different, and thus its resistance does not constitute an argument against us. To unequivocally establish the levelling process also in the ethical domain, one would need to consider objects in the evaluation of which, as in the evaluation of works of art, utilitarian considerations are irrelevant to the assessment, such as: what interest is the source of utilitarian norms; or, in each individual action, what it has in view as its ultimate goal; or, the purely internal state of the soul that does not manifest itself in deeds. Then it would be easy for us to conclude that the cracks and gaps here are no less significant than in the realm of pure beauty and that the blindness to value, which is a heroic sacrifice of those devoted to pure knowledge, has also affected a considerable part of the community in this realm – in whose life it has become nothing but a disability.

“Pamiętnik Warszawski” R. 2 (1930), no. 4/5, pp. 104-115; reprint in the volume Value and Man, Toruń 1966, pp. 150-159; reprint in the volume Z historii filozofii, Kraków 1995, pp. 218-230; reprint in the volume Pisma aksjologiczne, Lublin 2002, pp. 353-362.

[1] This thesis, at the time I wrote this, was adhered to by the most serious axiologists, including M. Hartmann; inherent in what is valuable was, for them, the so-called Seinsollen, even sometimes treated as a definition of value. However, it is not convincing. It does not countenance the fact that value has degrees, from very high to very low; and while it may be permissible to say that even a minimally valuable thing is wrong to destroy, to “precipitate out of existence”, it would probably not make good sense to say that every minimally valuable thing “ought to be” unreservedly, i.e. also to enter into existence if it does not yet exist. Much more strongly imposed is the idea that what already exists should become as valuable as possible. And this is probably how cultural human activity should be understood; not as the introduction into existence of more and more valuable objects (like some museum we would like to enrich), but as the transformation of what exists towards the highest attainable value.

[2] This assertion may seem striking and exaggerated. Its impact may diminish if we realise, firstly, that it refers not to the duties of individual persons (which they will always have in abundance) but to humanity as a whole; secondly, it should be understood that, in the most common sense, morality is included in culture. So, I am not advocating a form of „culturalism” with any immoralistic inclination.

[3] Not quite. In Aesthetics as a Value Discipline I introduced a distinction which was generally met with approval. See in the volume Value and Man, Toruń 1966, p. 34, note 1.

[I] From the editors (footnotes I-V: Pawel Okołowski):

Elzenberg’s article was discussed in the 1990s at the seminar Religion and Values by his student Professor Bogusław Wolniewicz. Based on the remarks made then, mainly by Wolniewicz, his ideas can be clarified and “updated”. Firstly, this text (from 1930) is at least in a double sense “prophetic”. It foretells the “coexistence of science with barbarism” in the form of two state totalitarianisms: USSR and the Third Reich. It also anticipates a powerful social trend growing in the West after the Second World War, namely political correctness. (Almost a century ago, the author could not have known about both). Well, “political correctness” is about banning judgement, in the name of equality, because valuing perpetuates traditional social hierarchies. Such a ban implies a leftist repression of free speech. For since “all things are equal”, traditional judging of any creation is “hate speech”. Only pro- or anti-equality activities are allowed to be judged. Elzenberg’s article further allows for the future existence of a technological totemism, based on the “hegemony of science” (applied) in society.

[II] The opposition between science and culture, constantly present in the article, can be misleading. Sets of scientific and cultural achievements are not disconnected, but intersect: theoretical science, with its most outstanding creations like grand theories (Newton's, Darwin's, etc.), can be part of culture. Understood in this way, science is, says Elzenberg, “one of the branches of culture”. Applied science, that is, the utilitarian use of these theories, does not belong to culture. And it is the hegemony of applied science (born of its cult, i.e. belief in man) that poses a threat, wreaking “havoc in culture”, causing “blindness to value” on a collective scale.

[III] The word “culture” in general has a (dictionary) dual sense: either descriptive (e.g. “ancient Egyptian culture” as a totality of artefacts) or normative (that which is indeed valuable, among these artefacts, regardless of their usefulness). Elzenberg considers culture in the second sense (being a Platonist, so an objectivist and absolutist in axiology). He gives the following definition: culture = the sum total of valuable things created by man. The author has in mind the entirety of realised perfect values, i.e. what is ought to be (by the power of the “oughtness of being”). But he seems to take into account only masterpieces - the creations of genius of Shakespeare, Chopin, also Korczak, etc. To this “artistic”, overly narrow definition, one should add patterns of behaviour (institutions in Gehlen’s sense), such as the respect for the dead, a sense of shame, the pursuit of truth, concern for the family, etc.). For without such patterns (without protoculture) there would be no masterpieces.

[IV] The author points out “sins against culture” to scholars. From today’s perspective, the attack on them is unjustified. The addressees of the criticism should be philosophers of science, writers and journalists and, more generally, the multitude of humanists who profess a cult of science. It is, in fact, a criticism of human smallness and resentment on the part of those incapable of creativity, within the professors and other “elites” of an egalitarian society. Elzenberg did not experience egalitarianism (on today’s scale), although he intuited it. Another thing is the tragedy of scientists (e.g. nuclear physicists or molecular biologists) facing the necessity of choosing between the pursuit of truth and the barbarism of the applications of their research.

[V] Distinguishing between two types of thinking: “scientific and evaluative”, they can be defined more generally: as descriptive and evaluative. The former goes far beyond science, limiting itself to the statement of facts and their characterisation. Everyone has both types of thinking at his or her disposal, to varying degrees and proportions. They are used alternately and consciously, although sometimes they clash with each other. Judgement can make it difficult for someone to observe impartially, but it can also save them from “impartiality” (opportunism or cynicism) in the case of, for example, barbaric research.