Europe’s Vocation, Mission and Role in the Post-Historical West

The West before 1989 

Until 1989, it was fairly easy to identify where the border of the "West" lay. The West began west of the Elbe, with a small exclave in West Berlin.  On one side was the world of democracy, free market economy, personal freedoms and prosperity; on the other, the world of communism, a planned economy with ever-increasing shortages, oppression, forced atheization and the fight against Christianity, and before the 1953 mass crimes.

This division ran through the middle of Europe.  My generation, born after the Second World War and growing up in communist Poland, dreamed not only of a short trip to the "West", but also of the "return to Europe" of our countries, even though, nominally, in a geographical sense, we had never left. At that time, from 1945 to 1989, only part of Europe in the geographical sense was the "West" in the political sense.  And in our opinion, this was the "real Europe" – the part of Europe that was liberated in 1944/1945 by the Allies, and in fact by the Americans. The "East" stretched from the Elbe to Kamchatka. The part of Europe occupied by the Red Army was no longer "Europe" but a different civilisation.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of "Mitteleuropa", Central Europe, was revived as a forgotten region of Europe, unfortunately occupied by this other, non-European Eastern civilisation.  This was the result of new freedom movements and trends that emerged at that time: KOR, Charter 77, Solidarity. The Nobel Prize awarded to Czesław Miłosz and Milan Kundera's famous essay on a divided Europe, published in the “New Yorker Review of Books”, also contributed to this. 

The countries of Central Europe, wanting to "return to Europe", wanted to become part of the "West" in the sense of the time.  Milan Kundera wrote: "In fact, what does Europe mean to a Hungarian, a Czech, a Pole? For a thousand years their nations have belonged to the part of Europe rooted in Roman Christianity. They have participated in every period of its history. For them, the word 'Europe' does not represent a phenomenon of geography but a spiritual notion synonymous with the word 'West (1). Thus, the two concepts were considered synonymous.

/// The West is no longer perceived as completely uniform in political terms, as it was during the Cold War – there is increasing talk of political differences between Europe and the United States. ///

Just before the fall of communism, Central Europe became fashionable, even snobbishly. At that time, any self-respecting Western intellectual who did not want to be considered provincial had to visit Prague, Krakow or Budapest. This recognition reached its peak in 1989, when the process of the collapse of communism began. The contribution of Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and other nations to the unification of the continent was appreciated. Today, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and other Central European nations are already part of "Europe"; they are also part of the West, members of the European Union and NATO. But have we returned to the Europe we wanted to return to? What is "the West" today?

The West is no longer perceived as completely uniform in political terms, as it was during the Cold War – there is increasing talk of political differences between Europe and the United States. And yet it was the US that ensured – and still ensures – Europe's security. The US was the leader of the Western world. Back in the late 1990s, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote and said that Europe was a protectorate of the US. A significant rift appeared during the American intervention in Iraq. At that time, two left-wing intellectuals, Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas, announced the birth (or perhaps the rebirth) of Europe and the division of the West – Europe was to emancipate itself from American influence and remember its uniqueness. And although relations improved afterwards, the differences with North America are now being emphasised again. Following the European media, one can see that Donald Trump is mentioned as a problem for Europe just as often as Vladimir Putin. Europe is to become a different and more sovereign entity vis-à-vis the US and is increasingly identified with the European Union. A pro-European is someone who advocates further integration and does not criticize the actions of EU institutions.

What Europe, which West?

So, what is Europe? What is the West? We know that both concepts have changed their meanings throughout history. They carry normative connotations. They also function differently in the narratives of different European nations, sometimes appearing with similar meanings but different connotations: "-West", "der Westen", "l'Ouest" and "l'Ovest” carry different meanings than „Abendland", "Occident", "l'Occident" and "l'Occidente" (2).

Let us recall that at the very beginning, the "West" was only Greece, which in the first half of the 5th century BC defined its identity in opposition to the Persian Empire. It was an opposition between the Greeks and the "barbarians", the West (dysmaí or hespéra) and the East (anatolé), the Occident and the Orient. Later, in the Middle Ages, the West was synonymous with the area of the Western Church, Latin as opposed to Orthodox Christianity, Greek, from Byzantine Europe. The concept of the West, encompassing Europe and North America, began to be used more widely only at the end of the 19th century (3). For example, in his philosophy of history, Hegel still excluded the "new world", i.e. America, from history, from the march of the absolute spirit. He believed that this new world had not yet made its mark on history and therefore could be ignored. According to him, the "old world" consisted of three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. However, Africa was, in his view, a blank page in history, irrelevant from the point of view of the philosophy of history. So only Asia and Europe remained – Morgenland, the land of beginnings and the past, and Abendland, to which the present belonged, where the absolute spirit was coming to self-awareness. 

Geography cannot answer the question of what Europe is and what the West is. The boundaries are fluid. The origins of European culture developed in the Mediterranean basin, and therefore also in North Africa. And where does Europe end in the east? The contemporary school answer is that it ends in the Urals and the Caucasus.  But this is an arbitrarily established border. It was not until the 18th century that the Urals were recognised as the geographical border of Europe, when Russia grew in strength after the reforms of Peter I and began its "Drang nach Westen". 

/// The closer a nation was to Russia, the more it doubted its European identity. ///

Is Russia a European country, then? The question of Russia's belonging to Europe is controversial and complex. Undoubtedly, there was a class of Europeanised people in Russia who created works important for European culture. From the 18th century onwards, Russia participated as a power in European politics, etc.  Therefore, when Mikhail Gorbachev spoke in the 1990s about a common European home, many politicians and intellectuals took it at face value. The closer a nation was to Russia, the more it doubted its European identity. Intellectuals from Central and Eastern Europe, including Kundera, saw Russia as a country different from Europe, as a different civilisation.

In this regard, the position of the eminent Polish historian Oskar Halecki is interesting. On the one hand, he emphasized that part of Russia is indeed part of Europe, namely Eastern Europe, but he also shared the view that Russia is culturally distinct (4).
In Central Europe, communism was seen as a result of Russian history, not as a break with its continuity. Kundera asked: "Is communism the negation of Russian history or its fulfilment?  And he answered: "Certainly it is both its negation (the negation, for example, of its religiosity) and its fulfilment (the fulfilment of its centralising tendencies and its imperial dreams)." 

Today's Russia combines the legacy of tsarism and communism. In Western Europe, there is no longer any tendency to talk about Russia as part of Europe. Its cultural alienation has become apparent even to its former admirers in France, Italy and Germany. The brutal aggression against Ukraine and the crimes committed have brought to mind those features of Russian civilisation that Europe did not want to remember, which Poles were already talking and writing about in the 19th century, such as Adam Mickiewicz in his Paris lectures and Zygmunt Krasiński in his political writings. Currently, "Western" scholars – Slavicists, historians, political scientists – are examining their consciences and hastily revising their views on Russia. German specialists are discovering their Russophilia and deliberating on the cultural causes of Russian aggression (5). Professor Ewa Thompson, author of a well-known book on imperialist ideology in Russian literature, has proposed the decolonization of Slavic studies in the United States: "Why should such a process take place?

First, because the current situation does not reflect the real weight and importance of literary and cultural activity in non-Germanic Central Europe and in Eastern Europe. The war in Ukraine began to tear off the curtain that obscured a world of which American and European students of Slavic studies had no idea. Second, because the war in Ukraine is rearranging the relative political weight of non-Germanic Central Europe and Eastern Europe. Yes, I do recognize the importance of nuclear ICBMs in Russia's possession, but I also recognize the realities of Ukrainian courage and willingness to sacrifice for the preservation of Ukrainian identity. I also recognize the richness of the intellectual landscape in places that until now have been dismissed as “Eastern Europe” (6).

Christian Europe

If it is impossible to define either Europe or the West solely in geographical terms, can it be done by referring to its spirit, its culture? Despite all its historical variability, we must assume that something must connect all meanings of Europe and the West, otherwise we would not use the same words or concepts.

How can we characterize this civilisation, this culture that we call European or Western?  The standard answer is that Europe is founded on the heritage of Greek philosophy, Roman law and Christianity - symbolized by three cities – Athens, Jerusalem and Rome. However, the cultural content denoted by these places never formed a harmonious whole from the outset.  Tertullian, who is considered the father of Latin Christianity, asked: "What does Athens have in common with Jerusalem? What does the academy have in common with the church? What do heretics have in common with Christians? Our teaching comes from Solomon's vestibule, who himself taught that the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart."

To this day, there is still debate as to whether Christianity's adoption of Greek philosophical concepts distorted its essence, as critics of the "Hellenisation" of Christianity claim (7). The Catholic Church has always defended this synthesis of metaphysics and faith, although it emphasized that the truths of faith transcend reason. Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI, emphasized in a negative reference to Nietzsche that "Christianity is not Platonism for the people". Rome and Jerusalem were also fundamentally opposed at the beginning. After all, according to Gibbon, Christianity was one of the factors in the fall of the Roman Empire. However, the Church took over the foundations of Rome's political structure in a different form and continued, as Hannah Arendt wrote, the Roman triad of religion, authority and tradition (8).

/// Since the 19th century, the history of Europe has been presented as a history of departure from Christianity – first liberation from the power of the Church in the Reformation, then from Christianity in general, until the present day, when Christianity is one of many religions, not without influence in political and social life. ///

Our tradition is a constant dialogue, sometimes a struggle, between these elements. And this was the source of its dynamism. Yet this simple formula of three cities overlooks the fact that Christianity, which absorbed elements of Greek philosophy and Roman state culture, was by far the most important factor in the emergence of European civilisation. At first, Christianity did not cover the entire geographical area we call Europe, nor was it limited to it alone. Over time, however, it acquired territorial significance – it came to mean the part of the world inhabited by Christians who belonged to the Roman Church (9). The "Latin civilisation" (10) known as "Christanitas", Western Latin Christianity, that took shape in the north-western part of geographical Europe also encompassed Central and Eastern Europe in the 10th century, which was mainly inhabited by Slavic peoples.  However, since the Reformation, Western Christianity has ceased to be a unified entity, which is why some historians believe that Christian civilisation ended between 1517 and 1648 (11). A well-known German historian of the Middle Ages summarises this story as follows: “For a long time, Europe was more or less identical with the Catholic Church, in contrast to the Orthodox Church, Greek Christianity or, as Luther said, the 'Orient'.

But since Luther's time, this distinction no longer really applies, because Western Christianity was largely no longer Catholic and Eastern Christianity was largely becoming Turkish at that time." (12). In the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the concept of Europe became popular as political expression and was used for self-identification. “For the last time Christendom served as the symbol of supreme loyalty when the 'hereditary enemy of the Christian name' drove the 'Christian forces' out of Hungary and appeals went forth for aid in the 'bellum sacrum in rem Christianam.” (13). Since the 19th century, the history of Europe has been presented as a history of departure from Christianity – first liberation from the power of the Church in the Reformation, then from Christianity in general, until the present day, when Christianity is one of many religions, not without influence in political and social life. The history of Europe is a history of progressive secularization, leading to today's "post-Christian" Europe. To this day, the history of Europe taught at American universities is very often limited to the history of certain European countries – Great Britain, Germany and France. In this narrative, which currently dominates the EU, the proper history of Europe begins with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. This is the pattern used to present the history of Europe, for example at the House of European History in Brussels.

  
/// The separation of theology from philosophy, of faith from reason, leads to Christianity losing its demythologising role and philosophy becoming trivial. ///

Europe is to be united by general principles, not by its particular history and unique traditions.  It is to be based on the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. These values are interpreted by liberal-left circles.  Contemporary Western culture, shaped after the fall of communism as a political system, is based on the idea of a completely free individual. Free choice and "self-realization" of human being are the guiding principles of contemporary Europe As Max Scheler once rightly stated, this is not only a break with the history of Europe to date, but an experiment unknown to humanity.
What is the place of Christianity in this civilisation?  In a way Christianity contributed to its creation. Contemporary humanitarianism is a mutation, a distortion of it, reminiscent of what the Young Hegelians and French philosophers like  Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Claude-Henri de Saint Simon with his project of new Christianity, and August Comte with his religion of humanity, wanted.

This is pseudo-Christianity, which dispenses not only with the old dogmas, but also with God. God has become completely human. Just as monotheism was once the bridge connecting Christianity with philosophy, anthropology is now becoming the link with contemporary humanitarianism, the public philosophy of liberal democracy – the incarnation and figure of Jesus not as the Son of God, Christ, but as an exceptionally good man, as one of the prophets, as a teacher who shows us how to live. Faith has become a private matter in Europe. There are many religious in our societies, tolerating each other and engaging in polemics. Admittedly, religious fundamentalists have appeared in this post-Christian Europe, but they are followers of Islam, and only they are prepared to kill and die for their faith. Optimists believe that the "Europeanisation" of Islam is possible, that it will undergo the same evolution as Christianity.  Contemporary Christianity also proclaims that everything has already been accomplished, that humanity has already been saved and redeemed. There will be no other salvation than that which is taking place in the world, in perfect liberal democracy, in the European Union.  Only a few live in expectation of another, true salvation – the second coming of Christ - and their own salvation or damnation after death.  

The philosophical traditions of metaphysics were also rejected in the 20th century. Philosophy became a specialised academic discipline that satisfies certain intellectual interests, whims or needs. It does not formulate definitive answers to questions, but most often questions their validity, considering them to be the result of linguistic complexities and misunderstandings of grammar. In John Paul II's encyclical Fides et Ratio, we read:  "With a false modesty, people rest content with partial and provisional truths, no longer seeking to ask radical questions about the meaning and ultimate foundation of human, personal and social existence. In short, the hope that philosophy might be able to provide definitive answers to these questions has dwindled."  The time for synthesizing the philosophy of the great metaphysical tradition of Greece and Christianity has passed; Benedict XVI admits that the relationship between philosophy and faith needs to be redefined. In a conversation with Habermas, he spoke of pathology in religion and pathology in reason, and of the need for correlation between reason and faith, which need each other, heal each other and purify each other (14). Faith has been abandoned by philosophy (15). But without reference to reason, Christianity will lose its power and its universality. The separation of theology from philosophy, of faith from reason, leads to Christianity losing its demythologising role and philosophy becoming trivial. 

An anti-national union

Contemporary Europe is not only turning away from its Christian heritage, but also, in its pursuit of uniformity, undermining another essential feature of our civilisation – its political and national pluralism. Europe has never been a single state or empire, despite attempts to rebuild the Roman Empire, the idea of renovatio imperii. Napoleon Bonaparte ruled almost all of Europe only for a short time. Hitler also attempted to unite Europe in the fight against decadence, Bolshevism and ‘plutocracy’. As Michael Burleigh writes: "The Nazi plans for Europe included realistic plans for the effective economic exploitation of the continent, turgid jurisprudential tracts outlining a European 'Monroe Doctrine'; works of pseudo-history extolling ahistorical versions of the medieval Holy Roman Empire; and quasi-ethnographic attempts to destroy existing nation states in favour of a patchwork quilt of subatomic regional particles" (16).

Attempts to unify Europe by force have never succeeded. However, there has almost always been some form of looser European unity, a broader European political order – Respublica Christiana, which later took the form of an awareness of a community of Christian states. There were also family ties between royal and aristocratic families. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Holy Alliance was formed, and a little later there was talk of a pentarchy - five European powers agreed on the principles of political order on the continent. After the First World War, the political order in Europe was to take into account the principle of self-determination of nations. In Western Europe, the sovereignty of nation states was limited by American dominance, while in Central Europe, which was controlled by the Soviet Union, it was largely a fiction.

European integration was intended to prevent conflicts between nations, but initially it was not directed against nation states. On the contrary, as Alain Milward proved in his well-known book, it was European integration that saved and strengthened European nation states, which in the 1930s were experiencing a great crisis and were shaken by social and political conflicts (17). The subsequent steps towards European integration did not result from the ideology and political actions of federalists, but, as Andrew Moravcsik showed, were the result of bargaining between Member States (18).

/// European integration was supposed to enable the development of this diversity, not be the end of it.  ///

The European Union was intended to be a union of states that did not allow for a strict hierarchy among European nations. This equality was expressed in the principle that the most important decisions were taken unanimously, that each state was represented by a commissioner, etc. Even in the 1990s, Europe's cultural and political diversity was constantly emphasized. European integration was supposed to enable the development of this diversity, not be the end of it. Small and large states, small and large nations could count on equal participation in the European community. According to the eminent German historian Klaus Zernack, this equality between small and large nations is a distinctive feature that defines Europe (19).

According to Kundera, one of the most important differences between Central Europe and Russia was precisely this diversity: “nothing could be more foreign to Central Europe and its passion for variety than Russia: uniform, standardising, centralising, determined to transform every nation of its empire ( the Ukrainians, the Belorussians, the Armenians, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, and others) into a single Russian people (or, as is more commonly expressed in this age of generalised verbal mystification, into a 'single Soviet people')”. In addition to political equality, cultural equality was also emphasized, which is why all EU documents are still translated into national languages today. 

 The 1990s were not only years of defeat and retreat for the Marxist left, which had dominated intellectual life in Western Europe since 1968 in previous decades, but also a true "new spring of nations". In 1989 and the following years, supranational entities such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia collapsed, and even very small nations regained their freedom. Contrary to the dogmas of the German left , Germany was reunified, or more precisely, the GDR joined the Federal Republic of Germany and was absorbed by it. The sense of national unity overcame the barriers of communist indoctrination, which seemed particularly effective in the case of the GDR. All this contradicted the common, dominant philosophy of history, which said that only supranational political entities – unions and federations – had a future. Progressive intellectuals watched with surprise as long-forgotten countries and nations such as Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, Montenegro and Ukraine reappeared on the map. It was patriotism that defeated communism. Communism in Europe was overthrown as a result of resistance by the "backward" nations of Central and Eastern Europe against the progressive, universalist ideology of Marxism, which was taught with zeal and fervour at many "Western" universities.  

However, there was great concern as to whether all these mostly small and poor countries, with difficult pasts and often disputed borders, would be able to bear the burden of independence, or whether new ethnic and national conflicts would erupt. The war in the disintegrating Yugoslavia confirmed these fears. Even then, people consoled themselves with the thought that this was only a temporary paroxysm of separatism, resulting from the negative experiences of unions and federations based on coercion. Soon, the European nations were to find themselves in a different political entity, but this time based on completely different principles, respecting their rights and freedoms. Closer integration, followed by its extension to countries outside the former Iron Curtain, was to create a European order, prevent conflicts and restore stability. The idea of a "post-national Europe" began to be promoted, with the diversity of regions and cities as the preferred type of diversity.  

Today, according to the dominant philosophy of history, "nationalism" is responsible for all of Europe's misfortunes, understood not as fanatical chauvinism, but broadly as a sense of national belonging, thinking in terms of nations and their rights. Indeed, there was no shortage of national conflicts in Europe. But wars, massacres and slaughter also occurred in other eras, when the dominant form of political organization in Europe was not the nation state. And the First World War, as the German call it, "Urkatastrophe", was not a conflict between nation states, the result of Serbian nationalism and other ambitions of "small" nations, but imperial rivalry. The thesis that its alleged second act – World War II – was the result of "Wilsonism" – the idea of basing the political order in Europe on the nation state – is also more than questionable.  

The political order of Europe established at Versailles proved to be short-lived, but it collapsed not because of the nationalism of small nations, but because of the resentment, revisionism and aggression of the defeated imperial nations – the Germans and Russians. Their aggression was justified and motivated by a supranational ideology.  National Socialism and communism were not simply forms of nationalism. Communism was an internationalist ideology that preached the unity of the global proletariat. National Socialism appealed to the solidarity of the "master race" and it was no coincidence that it found many supporters and collaborators outside Germany as well. It was undoubtedly a pan-European movement. Both the National Socialists and the Communists murdered "nationalists" in Poland and other European countries who were attached to their homeland and the principle of self-determination of nations. 

/// However, nations are a permanent feature of Europe. Even in today's Europe, their existence cannot be ignored. ///

 Today, the Union is once again being built as an alternative to the nation state. Supporters of further integration would like to reduce the role of Member States by transferring some of their powers to the European Council. The principle of unanimity in the Council of the European Union is increasingly being restricted. There are proposals to abolish it altogether, to introduce transnational lists for elections to the European Parliament, etc. Supporters of "Europeanisation" want Europe as a continent to become a single political space. The EU has been extremely liberal and generous in its immigration policy, keeping its borders wide open until recently. This was linked to the promotion of multiculturalism as a model of social life. Both internal and external immigration allows for the dilution of overly strong national – nationalistic – identities and thus has positive effects from this point of view. Growing decision-making power and the accumulation of administrative authority have led the EU and its supranational institutions – the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union – to consider their "borrowed sovereignty" as their own.

The Commission is to be a super-government, the European Parliament a higher-level parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union the highest Constitutional Court of the Union. This is not in line with the treaties, so they are considered an obstacle and are often circumvented or violated. And national languages are slowly being replaced by Euro-English, a new bureaucratic variety of English.  Opponents see this as a violation of the right to self-determination and an attempt to replace the Union as a union of states with a federal state.

However, nations are a permanent feature of Europe. Even in today's Europe, their existence cannot be ignored. The problem with the European Union is that in its desire to combat nationalism, it combats patriotism, which is not contrary to a sense of solidarity with other Europeans or contrary to the spirit of Europe, but is its only possible foundation. What is more, a kind of EU "nationalism" is emerging before our very eyes, which considers anyone who does not share the arbitrary interpretation of the values generally enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union to be an enemy of "Europe". This imperial EU nationalism was not directed against external enemies, but internal ones. In international politics, until recently – until the war in Ukraine – the EU was an "angel of peace", preaching multilateralism, focusing on negotiations and its economic influence – somewhat out of necessity, as it has no military force at its disposal. However, as is typical of any empire, it has a sense of its own uniqueness and global mission.

“Euro-nationalism” is becoming increasingly aggressive towards those it considers internal enemies. Its enemies are Catholic Poles, patriotic French, anti-immigration Italians, overly frugal Germans, the Visegrad Group, all "nationalists" attached to their homelands – France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Spain. At the same time, however, there is a clear hierarchy of nations and states within the Union. As a result of progressive integration, some are rapidly losing their ability to take sovereign action, while others are gaining, primarily Germany. Without the EU, Germany would quickly be brought back down to size – it is still too small for the world and too small to directly subjugate Europe. In the Union, it shares power with France, which retains the right of veto. The European Commission would not dare to interfere too bluntly in the internal affairs of these two countries. Beneath the surface of the Union's transnational institutions, one can still see the old politics of countries aspiring to superpower status. The increasingly talked about "sovereignty" of Europe would allow these aspirations to be realised and would strengthen their own sovereignty rather than reduce it. 

Europe's role in today's balance of power

The political order in today's Europe is unique and, perhaps, transitional.  It is not clear which direction Europe will take. On the one hand, there are still countries that are internationally recognized as sovereign, pursuing their own foreign , defence and, to a certain extent, economic policies. On the other hand, by joining the European Union, they have relinquished many of their powers – for example, control over their internal borders; it is the Union that now concludes international trade agreements on behalf of the states, sets climate and energy policy objectives, determines the overall economic strategy and plans transnational infrastructure. European countries have joined forces and transferred part of their sovereignty to a common pool in order to preserve and even strengthen it, as they claim. The treaties enshrine the principles of subsidiarity and organic competence. The Union, the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of government. The Union is therefore only to deal with issues that individual Member States cannot handle on their own. Formally, it is still not a politically sovereign entity, but an international organization, a bloc of states. Its growing decision-making power is based on the transfer of competences by states; it is a "borrowed" power. It is up to us to decide in which direction we will develop it.

Building a political union on this basis – aversion to faith, to one's own history and traditions, to Christianity, especially in its Catholic understanding, to European nations – leads to a weak Europe. This is how Europe is losing ground to the United States and China, as overwhelming economic data shows. Building a bureaucratic monster based on the ideology of a multicultural, ahistorical, completely secularized society is not the way to strengthen Europe, but to accelerate its decline.

/// Europe was born with the European nations and will die with them. It is reflected in them; it is embodied in them. ///

America renewed itself and built its power by reaching back to its roots, to the American creed. Making Europe great again, however, may be a more difficult task than renewing America. Europe needs a combination of spiritual and political unity and diversity. A different kind of European unity is possible than the bureaucratic one constructed from the headquarters in Berlaymont, but based on the cooperation of European nations, on their mutual respect and the principle of equality, a community of nations, their confederation, a "symmachia" referring to values that are already present in the European, Hesperian heritage. It is impossible to build Europe against the spirit of Europe, and therefore without Christianity, without reference to the great tradition in which Christianity interpreted, continued and transformed the Greek and Roman heritage. Today, Orthodox countries also belong to Europe. This opens the way to a new creative rethinking of our theology and philosophy. 

Nor is it possible to build the future of Europe on the belief that European nations are a harmful relic that must be replaced by an open, multicultural pan-European society. Europe existed and exists through its nations. Europe was born with the European nations and will die with them. It is reflected in them; it is embodied in them. A nation is not, by its very nature, a "reactionary" community that suppresses the freedom of individuals. The freedom of nations and the freedom of individuals were intertwined and mutually dependent. Unity must be developed not against European nations, but between them. The European Union requires a thorough restructuring, which should consist in clarifying and limiting its competences, and in renewing national and Christian traditions. Only then can Europe become a credible member of the "West" in the growing competition with China, Russia and India.

(1)    Milan Kundera, The Tragedy of Central EuropeNew York Review of Books Volume 31, Number 7, 26 April 1984
(2)    Jasper M. Trautsch, "Der Westen," Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 2018/2019, Vol. 60/61 (2018/2019), pp. 409-440
(3)    Cf. Heinrich August Winkler Geschichte des Westens: Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München 2009
(4)    Oskar Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History, London and New York 1950
(5)    Martin Schulze Wessel, Putin ist kein Betriebsunfall der russischen Geschichte, FAZ 01.05.2023; Thomas Thiel, Osteuropa-Geschichte. Milde Blicke aufs Imperium, FAZ 26. 03.2023
(6)    On Decolonising Slavic Studies in Europe and Americahttps://deliberatio.eu/en/analyses/on-decolonizing-slavic-studies-in-europe-and-america
(7)    Georg Essen, Hellenisation of Christianity? On the Problematics and Overcoming of a PolarisingInterpretative Figure, in: Theology and Philosophy 87 (2012), 1–17.
(8)    Hannah Arendt. Between Past and Future, New York 2006, p. 127
(9)    Ronald Bartlett, The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonisation and Cultural Change, 950–1350. Harmondsworth 1994, pp. 252–255.
(10)    Rémie Brague Europe, la voie romaine, Paris 1992
(11)    Mark Greengrass, Christendom Destroyed. Europe 1517–1649, London 2014,
(12)    Ferdinand Seibt, The Founding of Europe: An Interim Report on the Last Thousand Years, Frankfurt am Main, 2003.
(13)    H. D. Schmidt, The Establishment of 'Europe' As a Political Expression, The Historical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1966), pp. 172-178
(14)    J. Habermas, J. Ratzinger, Dialectic of  Secularisation. On Reason and Religion, Freiburg, Basel, Vienna 2006. pp. 56–57.
(15)    Joseph Ratzinger, Faith and Philosophy, in: The God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers, pp. 193-204, quote p. 193.
(16)    Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History, London 2000, p. 428.
(17)    Alain Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London 1992
(18)    Andrew Moravcsik The Choice for Europe, London and New York 1998
(19)    Klaus Zernack, On the Problem of National Identity in Eastern Central Europe, in: Helmuth Berding (ed.) National Consciousness and Collective Identity 2, Frankfurt am Main, p. 178

The article was published in *New Direction Review*, Issue 1, December 2025